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POST-ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
“[W]e think reformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a 
panacea . . . . It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of 
transformation that, for years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad 
other ways.”
John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, 
Politics, Markets, and American 
Schools, 1990
Over the past few decades, parental choice has exploded in the United States. 
Yet, despite early proponents’ hopes that parental choice would eliminate the need 
to regulate school quality—since parents’ choices would serve an accountability 
function—demands to use the law to hold chosen schools accountable for their 
academic performance are central features of education-reform debates today. This 
is an opportune time to consider the issue of academic accountability and parental 
choice. Parental choice has gained a firm foothold in the American educational 
landscape. As it continues to expand, debates about accountability for chosen 
schools will only intensify. The questions of whether, when, and how the law 
ought to regulate the quality of the schools participating in parental-choice 
programs are important and vexing ones for the law of education. This Article 
examines these questions and proposes principles to guide regulatory design efforts.
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For decades, advocates assumed that parental choice was the ul-
timate accountability device—a proverbial magic bullet that would 
improve the academic outcomes of all students in all schools. At 
least since the publication of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman’s
seminal 1955 essay, The Role of Government in Education, proponents 
have argued that empowering parents to select their children’s
schools will improve the academic achievement of students in both 
the public and nonpublic educational sectors.1 Friedman was not 
the first to argue that the financing and operation of elementary 
and secondary schools should be decoupled, and that the govern-
ment should fund private schools.2 However, he was the first to ar-
ticulate the case for giving parents publicly funded scholarships or 
“vouchers” redeemable at both public and private schools.3 And 
Friedman’s case for parental choice flowed from an assumption 
about the desirability of subjecting the public schools to market 
forces. “The interjections of competition,” he argued, would “stim-
ulate the development” of alternatives to public schools, “promote 
1. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST (1955), http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/330T/350kPEEFriedman
RoleOfGovttable.pdf.
2. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
3. See MILTON FRIEDMAN ON ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS 185 (Gary S. Becker, ed. 
2007) (“According to his article, which shocked many when it was first published in 1955, 
the government should continue to fund kindergarten through grade 12 education, but 
they should provide parents with vouchers that they could spend on the public or private 
schools of their choice.”).
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a healthy variety of schools,” and “introduce flexibility into school 
systems.”4
Friedman’s then-radical argument for vouchers languished for 
decades before finally gaining political traction with the Reagan 
administration, which proposed several modest federal voucher 
proposals and justified them by the need to promote, in the words 
of then-Education Secretary William Bennett, a “healthy rivalry”
between and among public and private schools.5 It gained further 
intellectual credibility with the publication in 1990 of John Chubb 
and Terry Moe’s influential book, Politics, Markets, and American 
Schools. Chubb and Moe argued that interjecting choice and com-
petition into the monopolistic American education system would 
prove so transformational as to obviate the need for all other edu-
cation reforms, including regulations holding schools accountable 
for the academic performance of their students. Indeed, Chubb 
and Moe argued that, “if choice is to work to greatest advantage, it 
must be adopted without these other reforms, since the latter are 
predicated on democratic control and are implemented by bu-
reaucratic means. The whole point of a thoroughgoing system of 
choice is to free the schools from these disabling constraints.”6
Over the past few decades, parental choice has exploded in the 
United States. Today, forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
permit charter schools, and over half of all states have at least one 
program in place that subsidizes (directly or indirectly) students 
attending private schools. In the current school year, approximate-
ly six percent of all public-school children in the United States 
(nearly three million) attend a charter school,7 and around three 
hundred thousand attend a private school with the assistance of a 
private-school-choice program.8 Yet despite early proponents’
hopes that parental choice would eliminate the need to regulate 
school quality, demands to use the law—in addition to parents’
choices—to hold chosen schools “accountable” for their academic
4. Friedman, supra note 1.
5. Robert Pear, Reagan Proposes Vouchers to Give Poor a Choice of Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 1985, at A20.
6. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 217 
(1990).
7. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S 
LARGEST CHARTER PUBLIC SCHOOL COMMUNITIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON STUDENT
OUTCOMES 2 (11th ed. 2016) [hereinafter A GROWING MOVEMENT], http://
www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CharterSchoolEnrollmentShare
Report2016.pdf.
8. MATT FRENDEWEY ET AL., AM. FED’N FOR CHILDREN GROWTH FUND, SCHOOL CHOICE 
YEARBOOK 2015–16, at 11 (2016) [hereinafter SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK], http://
afcgrowthfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2015-16-School-Choice-Yearbook-4_27.
pdf.
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performance are central features of education-reform debates to-
day.9
The current focus on accountability flows in part from the fact 
that the core justifications for parental-choice policies have shifted 
over the past twenty-five years. Somewhat ironically—since re-
searchers consistently find that subjecting traditional public 
schools to competition does improve their academic perfor-
mance10—parental-choice policies are no longer primarily justified 
by the need to subject government-operated schools to competi-
tion, but rather by the imperative of giving disadvantaged students 
alternatives to failing public schools. As parental-choice advocate 
Howard Fuller has observed, the goal of parental choice is today 
“more of a rescue mission than a fight for broad societal change.”11
This shift in justification has significant implications for debates 
about accountability and parental choice. If the goal of parental-
choice policy is to inject competition into the previously monopo-
listic American education markets, then regulators can, per Fried-
man, stand back and let competitive forces work their magic. On 
the other hand, if the goal is to ensure that as many children as 
possible attend high-quality schools as soon as possible, the partici-
9. See, e.g., THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY & PRIVATE SCHOOL 
CHOICE (Jan. 2014), https://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/Public-
Accountability-and-Private-School-Choice.pdf; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
IMPROVING SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE STATES (Dec. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/
educ/AccountabilityInPrivateSchoolChoice.pdf; Arianna Prothero, “There Is No Oversight”:
Private-School Vouchers Can Leave Parents on their Own,” EDUCATION WEEK (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/11/15/there-is-no-oversight-private-school-
vouchers-can.html; Dylan Peers McCoy, How Indiana Holds Private Schools Accountable,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY (May 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/
2017/05/how-indiana-holds-private-schools-accountable/526461/.
10. Studies of private-school-choice programs have found that public school perfor-
mance improved, at least marginally, a result of competition or the threat of competition 
resulting from parental choice. See, e.g., ANNA J. EGALITE, EDUC. RES. ALL. FOR NEW ORLEANS,
THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE LOUISIANA SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ON PUBLIC SCHOOL 
PERFORMANCE 4 (2016); Anna J. Egalite, Competitive Impacts of Means-Tested Vouchers on Public 
School Performance: Evidence from Louisiana and Indiana (Prog. On Educ. Pol’y and Govern-
ance, PEPG 14-05, 2014); David N. Figlio & Cassandra M.D. Hart, Competitive Effects of Means-
Tested School Vouchers, 6 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 133 (2014), Cecilia E. Rouse et al., Feel-
ing the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure, 5 
AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 251 (2013); Rajashri Chakrabarti, Vouchers, Public School Response, 
and the Role of Incentives: Evidence from Florida, 51 ECON. INQ. 500, 500–26 (2013); JAY GREENE,
PROG. ON EDUC. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE, AN EVALUATION OF THE FLORIDA A-PLUS 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM (2001); Caroline M. Hoxby, Rising Tide, 1 
EDUC. NEXT 68 (2001); JAY GREENE & RYAN H. MARSH, SCHOOL CHOICE DEMONSTRATION 
PROJECT, THE EFFECT OF MILWAUKEE’S PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM ON STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT IN MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2009); Rajashri Chakrabarti, Can Increasing 
Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher Program Affect Public School Perfor-
mance? Evidence from Milwaukee, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1371 (2008).
11. Larry Miller, No Principles, No Progress, RETHINKING SCHS., http://
rethinkingschools.aidcvt.com/restrict.asp?path=archive/29_02/29-2_miller.shtml (last visit-
ed Nov. 20, 2018).
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pation of subpar schools in choice programs is deeply problematic. 
And, unfortunately, market forces alone have proven ineffective at 
weeding all poorly performing schools out of charter school and 
private-school-choice programs. As even the most fervent parental-
choice proponents acknowledge, while many excellent schools par-
ticipate in these programs, some dreadful ones do as well.12
This is an opportune time to consider the question of academic 
accountability and parental choice.13 Parental choice has gained a 
firm foothold in the American educational landscape. As it contin-
ues to expand, debates about holding participating schools ac-
countable will only intensify. The questions of whether, when, and 
how the law ought to regulate the quality of the schools participat-
ing in parental-choice programs are important and vexing ones for 
the law of education. As the troubled experience with efforts to 
hold public schools accountable for student performance demon-
strate, a host of public-choice, selection-bias, and institutional-
design challenges haunt efforts to use the law to regulate school 
quality. Arguably, each of these challenges is compounded in the 
parental choice context for a number of interrelated reasons dis-
cussed below.
This Article, which examines these questions, proceeds as fol-
lows: Part I provides a brief overview of the landscape of parental 
choice in the United States. Part II canvasses the research on the 
academic effects of parental choice and charter schools on student 
performance—effects that undoubtedly are driven to a large extent 
by the quality of participating schools. Part III examines the cur-
12. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
13. This Article focuses solely on the academic performance of chosen schools. I leave to 
another day and other scholars the treatment of other contested accountability questions—
including governance, financial transparency, teacher qualifications, terms of service and 
retention, admission criteria, retention and expulsion rates, racial demographics, special 
education and inclusion, and nondiscrimination. I do so not because these issues are unim-
portant, but rather that they are important enough to deserve their own treatment. For 
some useful sources covering these issues, see ANNEBERG INSTITUTE FOR SCHOOL REFORM,
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHARTER SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT (Brown Univ. 2014), http://
www.annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf; Marcus A. 
Winters, What Underlies the So-Called Charter School ‘Special Education Gap’, REALCLEAR 
EDUCATION (June 20, 2014), http://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2014/06/20/
charter_school_special_education_gap_1025.html; ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE 
WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
STANDARDS (Jan. 2012), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/
integration-and-diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report; GROVER J. WHITEHURST ET AL.,
CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES, SEGREGATION, RACE AND CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT DO WE
KNOW? (Oct. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ccf_
20161021segregation_version-10_211.pdf; LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., LEARNING 
POLICY INST., PATHWAYS TO NEW ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS 
ACT (Apr. 2016), https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/pathways-new-accountability-
through-every-student-succeeds-act.
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rent state of accountability regulations in K-12 education policy, 
with a particular focus on charter and private-school-choice pro-
grams. Part IV explores the public-choice and institutional-design 
challenges plaguing efforts to hold chosen schools accountable. 
The Article concludes by recommending principles to guide ac-
countability regulations in the parental-choice context. These rec-
ommendations reflect the belief that the goal of accountability in 
this context should be to empower parents to make good choices 
for their children. Regulations promoting this goal should satisfy 
two criteria: First, they must provide parents the information that 
they need to make wise choices for their kids, which means that in-
formation about school quality must be readily available, transpar-
ent, easy to interpret, and reflective of the school-quality criteria 
that matter most to parents. Arming parents with information will 
enable them to serve an accountability function by making in-
formed decisions in school-choice markets. Second, accountability 
regulations ought to advance the goal of providing parents with 
access to more and better schools. In most cases, this latter goal is 
better advanced by attracting good schools to choice markets than 
by punishing bad ones. The exclusion of persistently failing schools 
from choice markets is perhaps a necessary element of an account-
ability regime, but it should not be the primary element. The long 
history of academic accountability efforts in the United States 
demonstrates both that punitive government regulations rarely 
drive school improvement and that closing bad schools works as a 
reform only when better options are available.
I. THE PARENTAL-CHOICE LANDSCAPE
Today, parents in many jurisdictions can choose from a range of 
schooling options across multiple educational sectors. Many dis-
tricts permit students to attend a public school other than the one 
geographically assigned to them, including magnet schools.14 And, 
as noted previously, forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
authorize charter schools,15 and more than half of all states and the 
District of Columbia have at least one publicly funded private-
school-choice program (although many of these programs are 
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL DEARMOND ET AL., CTR. FOR REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., MAKING 
SCHOOL CHOICE WORK 2–3 (July 2014), http://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/
CRPE_MakingSchoolChoiceWork_Report.pdf; James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2063–73 (2002).
15. See 50-State Comparison: Charter School Policies, EDUC. COMMISSION STATES (June 
2014), https://www.ecs.org/charter-school-policies/.
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quite modest).16 This multi-sector education policy represents a 
dramatic—indeed, seismic—shift away from historical practices in 
the United States. Although parents with the financial means to do 
so have long chosen their children’s schools, either by moving to 
school districts with high-performing schools or by financing pri-
vate education,17 the idea of publicly funding educational options 
other than government-operated schools is a deeply contested one 
in American history. While debates about parental-choice policy 
arguably date at least to the mid-nineteenth century,18 education 
policies that funded parents’ decisions to select any school other 
than the public school assigned to them by either geography or—
in the post-desegregation world—federal court order19 were virtual-
ly nonexistent until recent decades.20
A. Charter Schools
Parental choice within the traditional public-school sector argu-
ably began as a result of the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Mil-
liken v. Bradley, which dramatically constrained the power of federal 
courts to structure compulsory desegregation remedies that 
crossed school district boundaries.21 The decision prompted urban 
16. See generally SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8.
17. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U.
CHI. L. REV. 201, 212–14 (2010) (reviewing data). In 2007, the parents of twenty-seven per-
cent of public school children reported that they moved to their current neighborhood so 
that their child could attend his or her school. Fast Facts: Public School Choice Programs, NAT’L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=6 (last visited Oct. 23, 
2018). This kind of residential sorting increases as parents’ educational attainment rises. 
Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider, School Choice, Parental Information, and Tiebout Sorting: Evi-
dence for Washington, D.C., in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN 
HONOR OF WALLACE OATS 101, 104 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006).
18. See, e.g., MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, LOST 
COMMUNITY 16–18 (2014); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 221–29
(2002); JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 111–21 (2003).
19. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and especially 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), federal courts routinely 
ordered “busing” as a remedy for past discriminatory student assignment. See, e.g., David 
Armor, Bringing Back Busing: Do Benefits Outweigh Cost?, BROWN CENTER CHALKBOARD (Aug. 
23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2016/08/23/
bringing-back-busing-do-benefits-outweigh-cost/; Matthew Delmont, The Lasting Legacy of the 
Boston Busing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/03/the-boston-busing-crisis-was-never-intended-to-work/474264/.
20. Maine and Vermont have had “town tuitioning programs” that enable students re-
siding in districts without high schools to attend the public or private schools of their choice 
for over a century. See FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR EDUC. CHOICE, THE ABCS OF SCHOOL CHOICE:
2016 EDITION 59, 111 (2016). Minnesota has permitted parents to deduct a portion of pri-
vate-school tuition from state income taxes since 1955. Id. at 37, 43, 61–63.
21. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming 
Transformation of Education Law, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2017) (reviewing constitutional 
history).
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districts to experiment with strategies that sought to achieve inte-
gration by other means, including magnet schools and public-
school-choice programs that allow students to choose to attend a 
traditional public school other than one geographically assigned to 
them. In 1977, the Supreme Court approved these “compensatory”
strategies,22 and, since then, magnet schools and public-school 
choice has proliferated.23 Many Americans continue to select their 
children’s school by selecting a residence.24 While attendance at a 
traditional, geographically assigned public school remains the 
norm for a majority of American school children, the number of 
students attending a chosen public school continues to rise steadi-
ly. In 2007, over fifteen percent of all public-school students re-
ported attending a school other than the one geographically as-
signed to them, and forty-six percent of parents reported that 
public-school choice was an option for them.25 The availability of 
public-school-choice options is even higher in urban school dis-
tricts, many of which offer (in theory) universal public-school 
choice.26 A number of states also permit inter-district school 
choice, although the extent of choices available for low-income ur-
ban students is often dramatically constrained by available space 
and the public-choice reality that more affluent, higher-
performing public schools are often not particularly welcoming of 
transfers.27
As chosen (and sometimes semi-autonomous) public-school-
choice options, often with a specific curricular theme (such as 
22. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
23. See, e.g., Christine H. Rossell, Magnet Schools: No Longer Famous, but Still Intact, 5 
EDUC. NEXT 44 (2005), https://www.educationnext.org/magnetschools/; Donald Waldrip, 
A Brief History of Magnet Schools, MAGNET SCHOOLS AM. http://magnet.edu/brief-history-of-
magnets (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
24. In 2007, the parents of twenty-seven percent of public school children reported that 
they moved to their current neighborhood so that their child could attend his or her school. 
Fast Facts: Public School Choice Programs, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=6. This kind of residential sorting increases as parents’ educational 
attainment rises. Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider, School Choice, Parental Information, and Tie-
bout Sorting: Evidence from Washington, DC, in THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATS 101, 104 (William A. Fischel ed. 2006).
25. Fast Facts: Public School Choice Programs, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=6 (last visited May 15, 2018).
26. In practice, neighborhood schools favor residents of their geographic attendance 
zones, leaving limited space in high-performing schools for nonresident students. See Ryan & 
Heise, supra note 14, at 2064–65 (explaining that, even in districts with intra-district choice, 
“the default . . . is that students are assigned to neighborhood schools”). Most seats in mag-
net schools are allotted by lottery, test scores, or both. See Magnet Schools: By the Numbers,
MAGNET SCHOOLS AM., https://smartchoicetech.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/
MSA_Infographic.pdf (showing that preference lottery or blind lottery accounts for seventy-
four percent of student selection, and academic criteria accounts for seventeen percent of 
student selection) (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
27. Ryan & Heise, supra note 14, at 2066–73.
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STEM or the arts) magnet schools arguably paved the way for char-
ter schools—which are, without question, the single most signifi-
cant factor fueling a parental-choice revolution in the United 
States.28 Until Minnesota enacted the first charter-school law in 
1991, not a single charter school existed in the United States; to-
day, there are seven thousand.29 In the past decade, the number of 
students enrolled in charter schools has increased by two hundred 
and fifty-five percent. In 2013 alone, six hundred charter schools 
opened, and an additional 288,000 students enrolled in charter 
schools—a thirteen percent increase over the previous school 
year.30 And, while charter schools enroll only about six percent of 
public-school students nationwide, charter schools enroll much 
larger shares of students in many urban areas. In 2015, charter 
schools enrolled more than fifty percent of all students in three 
public-school districts, more than forty percent in six districts, 
more than thirty percent in seventeen districts, more than twenty 
percent in forty-four districts, and more than ten percent in one 
hundred and ninety districts.31
No one at the time that Minnesota began the charter-school ex-
periment could have anticipated the extent to which charter 
schools would revolutionize K-12 education in the United States. At 
their inception, charter schools were viewed as a means of injecting 
curricular diversity into the public education sector and were pro-
moted as a public-school choice device that offered a modest, secu-
lar alternative to school voucher proposals.32 Over time, however, 
charter schools have morphed into an entirely new, quasi-private, 
school sector that operates autonomously from and in competition 
with traditional public schools. Charter-school laws authorize the 
creation of new public schools through an agreement (the char-
ter) between a charter “authorizer” (which in some states includes 
a range of public and private entities) and a private-school opera-
tor. Proponents (and all charter-school statutes) consistently refer 
to charter schools as “public charter schools,” and they continue to 
28. See CHESTER E. FINN ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 17 (2000) (“[C]harter schools have cousins in the K-12 family. Their DNA looks 
much the same under the education microscope as that of lab schools, magnet schools, pri-
vately managed schools and special focus schools.”).
29. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Charter School Idea Turns 20, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 25, 
2008), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/03/26/29kahlenberg_ep.h27.html; Char-
ter School Facts, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH. https://data.publiccharters.org/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
30. See Charter School Enrollment Up 13 Percent This Year, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCH. (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/press/charter-school-
enrollment-13-percent-year/ (discussing statistics regarding the increase in public charter-
school enrollment).
31. See A GROWING MOVEMENT, supra note 7, at 2–3.
32. See Garnett, supra note 21, at 14
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have several attributes of public schools. Charter schools are tui-
tion free, secular, and are open to all who wish to attend.33 On the 
other hand, they are privately operated (increasingly by “charter 
management organizations” (CMOs) which operate multiple 
schools within and across jurisdictions), have wide-ranging auton-
omy over staffing, curriculum, budget, internal organization, and 
often depend heavily on supplemental funds provided by philan-
thropists and other private donors. And, like private schools, they 
are schools of choice—that is, parents select them for their chil-
dren and public funding “follows the child” to the school, as with 
students attending a private school through a private-school-choice 
program.34
The animating goals of the charter-school movement also have 
shifted over time. While charter-school proponents continue to 
emphasize the need to diversify the public education landscape, 
the dominant justification for charter schools has become the need 
to close the achievement gap by giving disadvantaged students an 
alternative to failing public schools.35 A majority of charter-school 
students today are minorities,36 and a growing body of evidence 
suggests that urban charter schools excel overall at the challenging 
task of educating vulnerable young people.37 These results, com-
bined with frustration with stalled efforts to reform urban public 
schools from within, have begun to lead some public education of-
ficials to enlist charter operators to assume control of failing public 
schools after other school “turn around” efforts have failed.38
33. Id. at 13; Valerie Strauss, How Charter Schools Choose Desirable Students, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/02/16/
how-charter-schools-choose-desirable-students/?utm_term=.8fc373b11296.
34. Several federal and state courts have held that, for constitutional purposes, charter 
schools are private. See, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Comm. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that an Arizona charter school was not a “state actor” for federal consti-
tutional purposes); League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2015) (invali-
dating charter-school law because charter schools are not “common schools” for state consti-
tutional purposes).
35. Tremendous diversity continues to characterize the charter sector. See MICHAEL Q.
MCSHANE & JENN HATFIELD, MEASURING DIVERSITY IN CHARTER SCHOOL OFFERINGS 4–5
(2015), https://www.aei.org/publication/measuring-diversity-in-charter-school-offerings/.
36. This fact has led to contested claims that charter schools are more racially isolated 
than traditional public schools. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY 
(Jan. 2012), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/choice-without-equity-2009-report; GROVER J. WHITEHURST ET AL., SEGREGATION,
RACE AND CHARTER SCHOOLS: WHAT DO WE KNOW? (Oct. 2016), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ccf_20161021segregation_version-10_
211.pdf.
37. See infra notes 66–70 and text accompanying notes.
38. During the 2012–2013 school year, eleven percent of charter schools were convert-
ed traditional public schools, including schools that have been removed from local control 
and placed under the authority of a special statewide “turnaround” district. See Nelson 
Smith, Turnaround School Districts: States Try Managing Lowest-Performing Schools, EDUC. NEXT
(Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.educationnext.org/turnaround-school-districts/
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B. Private-School Choice
The fact that charter schools, rather than private-school choice, 
would drive the parental-choice revolution is arguably one of the 
most unexpected domestic policy developments in recent history. 
In contrast to charter schools, which were, in 1991, little more than 
an amorphous idea that required the establishment of new schools, 
voucher policies had an older, more refined intellectual pedigree, 
a committed ideological base of support, and promised to enlist 
existing schools with a proven track record of educating disadvan-
taged kids, especially urban Catholic schools.39 The case for private-
school choice dates in the United States to the mid-nineteenth 
century, when Catholic bishops vigorously but unsuccessfully de-
manded public funds for students enrolled in Catholic schools on 
equality grounds.40 As discussed in the introduction, Milton Fried-
man revived the debate about education funding in his 1955 arti-
cle, The Government and Education,41 and the Reagan administration 
championed school vouchers as an alternative to the federal pro-
grams funding remedial instruction.42
Vouchers proposals languished for both legal and political rea-
sons, discussed in more detail below. Two events in 1990, however, 
catalyzed the modern parental-choice movement. The first was the 
publication of John Chubb and Terry Moe’s enormously influen-
tial book, Politics, Markets, and American Schools, discussed in the in-
troduction.43 The second was the emergence of a successful if unu-
sual political coalition in Wisconsin between African-American 
leaders in Milwaukee and Republican Governor Tommy Thomp-
son, which ultimately secured the passage of the nation’s first 
39. Beginning with the groundbreaking research of James Coleman and Andrew Gree-
ley, numerous scholars have found that Catholic school students—especially poor, minority, 
students—tend to outperform their public school counterparts. See ANDREW GREELEY,
CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AND MINORITY STUDENTS 108 (1982); JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
HIGH SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (1982); see also Derek Neal, The Effect of Catholic Secondary School-
ing on Educational Attainment, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 98 (1997) (finding that Catholic school at-
tendance increased the likelihood that a minority student would graduate from high school 
from sixty-two percent to eighty-eight percent, and more than doubled the likelihood that a 
similar student would graduate from college).
40. See GARNETT & BRINIG, supra note 18, at 16–17.
41. See What is School Choice?, FRIEDMAN FOUND. FOR SCH. CHOICE, http://
www.friedmanfoundation.org/schoolchoice/ (“In 1955, Dr. Milton Friedman proposed the 
idea of school vouchers, which would separate the financing and administration of schools, 
effectively jumpstarting the modern school choice movement.”) (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
42. Robert Pear, Reagan Proposes Vouchers to Give Poor A Choice of Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
15, 1985, at A20.
43. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 217
(1990).
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modern school voucher program.44 Initially, the Milwaukee Paren-
tal Choice Program entitled poor public-school children in the city 
of Milwaukee to spend a portion of their public education funds at 
secular private schools. The program was expanded to include re-
ligious schools in 1995.45 Ohio followed suit in the same year, en-
acting a private-school-choice program for disadvantaged children 
in Cleveland, most of whom opted to attend religious schools.46
Despite these initial inroads, private-school choice faced major 
legal and political obstacles. Legally, the question of whether the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause permitted the govern-
ment to expend public resources at religious schools remained un-
settled until 2002. Even after the U.S. Supreme Court settled the 
federal constitutional question in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,47 signif-
icant state constitutional hurdles to parental choice remained. 
Thirty-seven state constitutions contain provisions, commonly 
known as “Blaine Amendments,” that prohibit the public funding 
of private and/or “sectarian” schools.48 Following Zelman, many 
commentators predicted that these provisions represented major 
impediments to the expansion of private-school choice.49 While 
state constitutional hurdles have not proven to be as significant an 
obstacle to the expansion of parental choice as predicted,50 state 
constitutional challenges still inevitably follow the enactment of a 
new parental-choice program.51
44. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Maine and Vermont both have maintained 
“town tuitioning” programs, which permit students in towns without public high schools to 
use public dollars to attend other public or private, secular schools. Illinois and Minnesota 
have very modest non-refundable parental tax credit programs. See EDCHOICE, THE ABCS OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE: 2018 EDITION 55–57, 95–97 (2018), http://www.edchoice.org/School-
Choice/The-ABCs-of-School-Choice/2015-ABCs-of-School-Choice-WEB.
45. See State ex rel. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 608–10 (Wis. 1998) (summariz-
ing history of Milwaukee Parental Choice Program).
46. See Garnett, supra note 21, at 23.
47. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
48. These provisions, called “Blaine Amendments” for Senator James Blaine of Maine, 
who attempted as Speaker of the House in 1875 to amend the federal constitution to pro-
hibit the public funding of sectarian schools, reflect a lingering legacy of America’s histori-
cal anti-Catholic bias. See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, SCHOOL CHOICE AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 4 (2007), http://
www.alec.org/docs/IJ-ALEC-school-choice.pdf; Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine 
Amendments, 2 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 45 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional Ques-
tions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (2003); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouch-
ers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 
(2003).
50. While a number of lower state courts have relied upon Blaine Amendments to in-
validate private-school-choice programs, only two state supreme courts have done so. See
Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (invalidating voucher program); Taxpayers for 
Public Education v. Douglas County School District, 351 P.2d 461(Colo. 2015) (same).
51. Blaine Amendment challenges to private-school-choice programs have been reject-
ed by the highest court in Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, Alabama and, most recently, North 
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The political hurdles to private-school choice have proven even 
more substantial than the legal ones. For a variety of reasons, in-
cluding but not limited to political power and opposition of teach-
er unions, private-school choice has proven the proverbial “third 
rail” of education policy.52 Indeed, opposition to voucher proposals 
arguably fueled the movement to enact charter laws, which in turn 
took the wind out of the sails of the private-school-choice move-
ment. Charter schools were promoted as a “safer” and more “con-
strained” version of parental choice—one that is both “public” and 
“secular.” Within debates about educational finance, many moder-
ate reformers traditionally advocated for charter schools as an al-
ternative to private-school-choice programs such as tax credits or 
vouchers.53 For example, Michael Heise has demonstrated that the 
likelihood that a state enacted or expanded a charter program in-
creased along with the “threat” of publicly funded private-school 
choice.54
In recent years, proponents of private-school choice have begun 
to overcome these political barriers and secure the enactment of 
new programs. Today, more than half of states and the District of 
Columbia have publicly funded private-school-choice programs.55
Participation in private-school-choice programs has more than tri-
pled in the last decade. That said, since most programs are modest 
in scope and limited in eligibility—serving only low-income and/or 
disabled students—the number of students enrolled in private 
schools through one of these programs (approximately 300,000) 
remains only about a tenth of total charter-school enrollment.56
The movement for private-school choice has gained momentum 
for several related reasons. First, the exponential growth of charter 
schools has resulted in millions of children moving from publicly 
to privately operated schools. Ironically, charter schools, which ini-
tially were promoted as an alternative to vouchers, may have un-
Carolina. Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind. 2013); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 
602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 
(Ohio 1999); Magee v. Boyd, 175 So.3d 79 (Ala. 2015); Hart v. State of North Carolina, 368 
N.C. 122 (2015).
52. See, e.g., TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICAN’S 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 327–29 (2011) (discussing teacher-union opposition to private-school 
choice); Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the Expansion of 
School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1932 (2012) (“Understandably, and with 
considerable justification, school choice supporters reflexively blamed teachers’ unions for 
school voucher initiative losses.”)
53. JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE 3 115–70 
(2007).
54. Michael Heise, Law and Policy Entrepreneurs: Empirical Evidence on the Expansion of 
School Choice Policy, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1929–30 (2012).
55. See THE ABCS OF SCHOOL CHOICE, supra note 44, at 33, 55, 57–59, 95.
56. See SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 14–15.
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dermined the argument that private-school-choice is “radical” by 
normalizing the idea of parental choice.57 Moreover, and relatedly, 
opponents of parental choice today have had bigger battles to 
fight, including charter schools, which historically enjoyed broad 
bipartisan support but pose a serious competitive threat to urban 
school districts today.58 Second, beginning with Arizona in 1997, 
more than a dozen states have adopted a new private-school-choice 
device, the “scholarship tax credit,” which does not directly fund 
private-school scholarships, but rather incentivizes donations to 
private scholarship organizations.59 Scholarship tax credits are ar-
guably more politically palatable than vouchers.60 They also offer a 
way around the state constitutional restrictions on the public fund-
ing of private schools because state supreme courts appear inclined 
to follow the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn that taxpayers lack standing to 
challenge these programs because scholarship funds raised 
through tax credit programs are not public dollars.61 More recent-
ly, six states—Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, North Caroli-
na, and Tennessee—have adopted “education savings account”
programs that empower parents to spend state education funds on 
a range of educational expenses, including private-school tuition.62
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as previously discussed, 
the political coalition supporting private-school choice has ex-
57. JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE 3 (2007).
58. In recent years, the truce between charter schools and public schools has unraveled 
as charter market share has grown, and public schools have faced enrollment declines as a 
result. See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, Restoring Shanker’s Vision for Charter 
Schools, AMERICAN EDUCATOR, Winter 2014–15, at 4, 5 (“Proposed to empower teachers, de-
segregate students, and allow innovation from which the traditional public schools could 
learn, many charter schools instead prized management control, reduced teacher voice, fur-
ther segregated students, and became competitors, rather than allies, of regular public 
schools.”); Richard Whitmire, Charter School War could go National: Governor Andrew Cuomo is 
Winning the Battle in New York, But What About Your State?, USA TODAY, (Apr. 1, 2014), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/01/bill-de-blasio-cuomo-charter-schools-new-
york-column/7158071/.
59. The nation’s three largest private-school-choice programs (in terms of enroll-
ment)—in Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania—are all scholarship tax credit programs. 
SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8.
60. A 2014 poll conducted by Education Next found that support for tax incentive pro-
grams, such as scholarship tax credits, was actually higher than support for charter schools, 
with sixty percent of respondents supporting tax credit policies but only fifty-four percent 
supporting charter schools. Michael B. Henderson, Paul E. Peterson & Martin R. West, No 
Common Opinion on the Common Core, 15 EDUC. NEXT 8 (2015), http://educationnext.org/
2014-ednext-poll-no-common-opinion-on-the-common-core/.
61. 563 U.S. 125 (2011); see also, Travis Pillow, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Challenging Florida 
Tax Credit Scholarships, REDEFINED (May 18, 2015), https://www.redefinedonline.org/2015/
05/judge-plaintiffs-lack-standing-to-challenge-florida-tax-credit-scholarships/.
62. See What is an Education Savings Account?, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/
school-choice/types-of-school-choice/education-savings-account/ (last visited Oct. 22, 
2018).
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panded and diversified, and the arguments offered in favor of it 
have shifted from free market to social justice rhetoric.63 In this 
sense, the once-disparate arguments for charter schools and pri-
vate-school choice have converged to focus on the imperative of 
increasing the supply of high-quality educational options available 
to disadvantaged children. As Terry Moe has observed, “The mod-
ern arguments for vouchers have less to do with free markets than 
with social equity. They also have less to do with theory than with 
the commonsense notion that disadvantaged kids should never be 
forced to attend failing schools and that they should be given as 
many attractive options as possible.”64
II. THE PERFORMANCE DEBATE
As previously discussed, proponents initially justified parental 
choice as a means of injecting competition into education markets 
and holding public schools accountable for their performance. 
And, in fact, the available empirical evidence suggests that paren-
tal-choice policies do serve the “accountability” function that 
Friedman predicted they would: That is, numerous studies find 
that competition from private and charter schools improves public 
schools’ performance.65 These findings, however, play little role in 
the ongoing debates about parental choice, in large part because 
the dominant case for parental choice today is no longer about 
free markets but rather about the social justice imperative of rescu-
ing children from failing public schools. This argument inevitably 
raises questions about the quality of the schools participating in 
parental-choice programs. If the goal of parental choice is to give 
kids the option of exiting bad schools for good ones, then logically 
the choices available to exiting children ought to be good, not bad, 
ones. The question whether students participating in choice pro-
grams outperform their public-school peers therefore is not sur-
prisingly at the center of debates about the wisdom and efficacy of 
parental choice. The record provides ammunition for both sides of 
those debates. The answer to the question “do students do better 
in chosen schools?” appears to be “usually (over time), but not al-
ways.”
63. See MOE, supra note 52, at 329.
64. Id.
65. See studies cited supra note 10 (each examining effect of competition on public 
schools’ academic performance).
172 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 52:1
A. Charter Schools
The question of whether charter schools, on average, outper-
form traditional public schools remains contested.66 The emerging 
consensus position among education scholars is that even if char-
ter schools do not perform better overall than traditional public 
schools, they do a better job—in some cases, a much better job—at 
educating disadvantaged urban students.67 While tremendous re-
gional variations persist, a growing body of evidence confirms that, 
on average, disadvantaged minority students perform significantly 
better across a range of measures when they attend charter, rather 
than traditional, public schools.68 Most recently, the 2015 Stanford 
Urban Charter School Report, which compared the performance of 
charter- and public-school students in forty-one urban communi-
ties, found that urban charter-school students achieved, on aver-
age, forty additional days of learning growth in math and twenty-
eight days in reading compared to their peers in district schools.69
These findings are heartening since a majority of charter schools 
are located in urban areas and serve minority students.70
Critics frequently assert that charter-school gains result from the 
“cream skimming” of the best students from the pool of available 
applicants (and also from the expulsion of underperforming stu-
66. A high-profile study conducted in 2009 by Stanford University’s Center for Re-
search on Educational Outcomes (CREDO), found that charter schools do not outperform 
their public school counterparts (and, in fact, sometimes perform worse). CTR. FOR 
RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16
STATES, http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf. More re-
cent studies, including the 2013 update to the earlier CREDO study, find that charter 
schools outperform public schools among certain demographic groups and age ranges and 
in certain subject areas, although tremendous demographic and regional variations persist. 
See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY (2013),
http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf.
67. See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 
(2013), http://credo.stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf;
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION AND REG’L ASSISTANCE, NCEE STUDY SNAPSHOT: THE 
EVALUATION OF CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS (June 2010), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/
20104029/pdf/20104031.pdf; NEW YORK CITY CHARTER SCH. EVALUATION PROJECT, HOW 
NEW YORK CITY’S CHARTER SCHOOLS AFFECT ACHIEVEMENT (Sept. 2009), http://
users.nber.org/~schools/charterschoolseval/how_NYC_charter_schools_affect_
achievement_sept2009.pdf; HARVARD CTR. FOR EDUC. POL’Y RESEARCH, STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOLS (Jan. 2011), http://economics.
mit.edu/files/6493.
68. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, URBAN CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY REPORT 
ON 41 REGIONS (2015), https://urbancharters.stanford.edu.
69. Id. at 11.
70. In 2013–14, fifty-two percent of charter schools were located in urban areas, and 
sixty percent of charter-school students were racial minorities. Data Dashboard, NAT’L
ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/year/
2014.
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dents).71 The methodology used in the Stanford report described 
above, which matched charter-school students to demographically 
similar students in traditional public schools, cannot completely 
address this issue since students enrolled in charter schools may 
have characteristics that increase the likelihood that they will suc-
ceed, such as more motivated parents. Random-assignment studies 
of students in oversubscribed charter-school lotteries represent the 
only methodological approach that eliminates the risk of selection 
bias because researchers focus exclusively on students who apply 
for charter-school admission, some of whom are admitted and oth-
ers rejected. All of the available random-assignment studies of 
charter schools have found statistically significant, in some cases 
substantial, gains in reading and/or math for urban (but not sub-
urban) charter schools.72 These studies cannot, however, definitive-
ly resolve the question of whether charter schools outperform their 
public counterparts. While random-assignment studies represent 
the “gold standard” of educational research, these studies are not 
without problems: Importantly, since only over subscribed schools 
can be included, the sample sizes tend to be small.73 Some random-
assignment studies are of single schools or school networks,74 oth-
ers cover entire cities or states.75 The only nationwide study, which 
71. See, e.g., Kaitlin P. Anderson, Evidence on charter school practices related to student enroll-
ment and retention, 11 J. OF SCH. CHOICE 527-545 (2017).
72. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., THE EFFECTS OF CHARTER SCHOOL 
STUDENTS ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: A META-ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.crpe.org/publications/effect-charter-schools-student-achievement-meta-analysis-
literature (analyzing randomized assignment studies and concluding that charter elemen-
tary schools outperform traditional public schools in both reading and math, but charter 
high schools have no effects and that urban charter schools perform better than suburban 
and rural charter schools).
73. Moreover, it is possible that the oversubscribed schools are the best, most effective 
schools.
74. Caroline Hoxby & Jonathan Rockoff, The Impact of Charter Schools on Student Achieve-
ment (2004), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jrockoff/hoxbyrockoffcharters.pdf 
(finding significant gains in reading and math at Chicago International Charter School); 
Larry McLure & J. Cesar Morales, School Characteristics and Student Achievement (2005), 
https://create.ucsd.edu/_files/publications/PreussReportJune2004.pdf (finding, for Preuss 
Charter school, that test scores remained unchanged by college-enrollment rates increased 
by twenty-three percent); Joshua D. Angrist, Inputs and Impacts in Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn,
100 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 1 (2010) (finding achievement gains of 0.12 
standard deviations in reading and 0.35 in math after a single year); Justine Hastings, The 
Effects of School Choice on Intrinsic Motivation and Academic Outcomes (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 18,324, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18324.pdf (study 
of unnamed charter network in unnamed city, finding no visible math gains but significant 
reading and writing gains), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18324.pdf.
75. ATILA ABDULKADIROGUL ET AL., INFORMING THE DEBATE: COMPARING BOSTON’S
CHARTER, PILOT AND TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS (2009), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
cohodes/files/informingthedebate_final.pdf (finding after one year, Boston’s charter high 
schools produced gains of 0.16 standard deviations in reading and 0.19 standard deviations 
in math; charter middle schools in the city produced similar reading gains of 0.17 standard 
deviations and a remarkable 0.54 standard deviations in math); Joshua D. Angrist et al., Stu-
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included only thirty-six charter middle schools in fifteen states, 
found—in keeping with more focused studies—that charter 
schools in affluent areas produced lower results than neighboring 
schools, but urban charter schools posted significant gains, espe-
cially in math.76
B. Private-School Choice
Measuring and drawing generalizable conclusions about the ef-
fects of choice on student achievement is even more difficult in the 
private-school-choice context for a number of related reasons. In 
addition to the selection-bias concerns described above, the vari-
ous private-school-choice mechanisms (vouchers, tax credits, and 
education savings accounts) work very differently. While regional 
variations in charter-school programs are also significant, all char-
ter schools share some characteristics: Importantly, they are, by 
law, free to admitted students (that is, they may not charge tuition 
above the level of the per pupil public funding), and they must use 
lotteries to make admission decisions if demand exceeds available 
space. These characteristics are not uniformly true with respect to 
private-school-choice programs. For example, most programs per-
mit schools to charge parents the difference between the scholar-
ship level and tuition and give schools significant discretion in 
making admissions decisions.77 Moreover, scholarship-tax-credit 
programs guarantee no minimum level of public funding at all but 
rather incentivize donations to scholarship-granting organizations, 
which must raise money to support scholarships. As a result, the 
level of support per student participating in scholarship tax credit 
programs varies both across and within states.78 This model effec-
dent Achievement in Massachusetts’ Charter Schools (2011), http://economics.mit.edu/files/
6493 (finding that charter schools in non-urban areas produced no significant gains but ur-
ban charter schools produced middle school gains of 0.12 standard deviation in English and 
0.33 standard deviation in math and high school gains of 0.33 standard deviation in English 
and 0.39 standard deviation in math); Caroline Hoxby & Sonali Murarka, Charter Schools in 
New York City: Who Enrolls and How They Affect Their Students’ Achievement (Nat’l Bur. of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14,852, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14852 (finding 
.04 standard deviation gains in reading and .09 in math).
76. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. EVALUATION, The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts: Final 
Report, (2010), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104029/.
77. See EDCHOICE, THE ABCS OF SCHOOL CHOICE: THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO EVERY 
PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM IN AMERICA: 2018 EDITION 31, 39, 73 (2018) (highlight-
ing the rarity of “burdensome” requirements imposed on private schools in the District of 
Columbia, Louisiana, and Wisconsin, such as prohibiting schools from charging tuition 
“above the amount of the voucher” and using “their own admission standards”).
78. See id. at 82–126 (identifying a $500–$6,007 range in average scholarship value 
across states and noting that scholarship-granting organizations determine the scholarship 
amount per pupil within states).
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tively eliminates the possibility of broad-scale random-assignment 
studies of student performance.
Also in contrast to charter schools, which by law must be open to 
all students, the eligibility for private-school-choice programs varies 
widely. Many programs are means-tested, with eligibility limited to 
low-to-moderate income students;79 some programs are means-
tested with eligibility further limited to students transferring out of 
failing public schools.80 Additionally, a number of programs are 
limited to narrow categories of students, such as foster children 
and students with disabilities. These eligibility requirements dra-
matically complicate the selection-bias concerns. While participat-
ing students may be more likely to succeed academically than their 
peers because they have motivated parents, many programs are 
limited to categories of students that are more likely to have fallen 
behind their peers academically.
Most studies of private-school-choice programs find modest posi-
tive effects on academic performance over time (following early 
losses, in some cases), as well as more-significant longer-term ef-
fects on noncognitive variables, including high school graduation 
rates, college matriculation and persistence, and a reduced likeli-
hood of involvement in the criminal justice system.81 Eighteen ran-
dom-assignment studies have evaluated the academic effects of 
participating in publicly and privately funded school voucher pro-
grams.82 Of these, fourteen have found some positive effects on 
student achievement, most of them modest. Six of the studies 
found positive effects on all participating students, and eight found 
benefits for some group of students (for example, racial minorities, 
extremely disadvantaged students, and students exiting poorly per-
forming public schools) and no visible effects on others. For ex-
ample, the final review of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Pro-
gram found no overall effects on student achievement, but positive 
effects on certain subgroups in reading.83
There are numerous other studies that employ less reliable 
methodologies, including the “matched samples” method em-
ployed in the Stanford Urban Charter School Study described above 
79. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 8.
80. Id. at 9.
81. See, e.g., Celilia Elena Rouse & Lisa Barrow, School Vouchers and Student Achievement: 
Recent Evidence, Remaining Questions (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.ncspe.org/publications_
files/OP163.pdf.
82. See Martin Lueken & Michael Q. McShane, School Choice Research to Date (Nov. 27, 
2017), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/school-choice-research-not-rorschach-test/.
83. PATRICK WOLF ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE D.C. OPPORTUNITY SCHOLARSHIP 
PROGRAM, FINAL REPORT (June 2010), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104018/pdf/
20104019.pdf.
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and another methodology known as “experimental, regression dis-
continuity,” which seeks to approximate random assignment. Re-
searchers conducting these studies have reached mixed conclu-
sions: For example, the most recent review of the effects of 
participating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP)
in 2010 found that participating students scored higher than simi-
lar Milwaukee public school students in reading but not in math.84
However, the researchers found that participating in a program in-
creased the likelihood that students would graduate from high 
school and enroll in college by approximately twenty percent.85
The latter finding was in keeping with the random-assignment 
study of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, which found 
that participation increased students’ probability of completing 
high school from seventy to eighty-two percent.86 A study of the 
early results of Indiana’s statewide voucher program found no ef-
fect in reading and negative effects in math, but recently a follow-
up study by the same researchers found that students caught up 
and began to improve if they remained in their chosen school for 
four years.87 Recent studies of student performance in Louisiana’s
voucher program similarly found that students lost ground in the 
early years of participation, but caught up to and in some cases 
surpassed their public-school peers after three years in the pro-
gram.88
C. The Quality-Variation Problem
Studies of the effects of private-school choice and charter 
schools on student performance overall mask important variations 
84. JOHN WITTE ET AL., MPCP LONGITUDINAL EDUCATIONAL GROWTH STUDY FIFTH YEAR 
REPORT (2012), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/SingleStudyReview.aspx?sid=214.
85. PATRICK J. WOLF, THE COMPREHENSIVE LONGITUDINAL EVALUATION OF THE 
MILWAUKEE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM (Feb. 2012), http://www.uaedreform.org/
downloads/2012/02/report-36-the-comprehensive-longitudinal-evaluation-of-the-
milwaukee-parental-choice-program.pdf. More recently, researchers from the School Choice 
Demonstration Project found that participating in the MPCP was associated with a signifi-
cant decrease in later criminal behavior, with even stronger effects for students the longer 
they persisted in the program. Corey A. DeAngelis & Patrick Wolf, The School Choice Voucher: 
A “Get Out of Jail” Card? (Univ. of Ark. Dep’t of Ed. Reform Working Paper No. 2016-03, 
2016), http://www.uaedreform.org/the-school-choice-voucher-a-get-out-of-jail-card-2/.
86. Patrick J. Wolf et al., School Vouchers and Student Outcomes, 32 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 247, 252 (2013).
87. R. Joseph Waddington & Mark Berends, Impact of Indiana Choice Scholarship Program: 
Achievement Effects for Students in Upper Elementary and Middle School (2017) (unpublished draft 
on file with author).
88. Cory Turner & Anya Kamenetz, School Vouchers Get Two New Report Cards, NPRED
(June 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/06/26/533192616/school-
vouchers-get-a-new-report-card.
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among the schools participating in these programs. As a recent 
Slate article about charter schools observed, “There are some great 
ones but some real duds.”89 For example, a recent study by Stan-
ford’s Center for Research on Educational Outcomes found that 
students enrolled in charter schools operated by charter manage-
ment organizations (CMOs) experienced more significant gains in 
both reading and math than those enrolled in independent char-
ter schools.90 Schools in some networks, however, fared better than 
others,91 and certainly some independent charter schools outper-
form many CMO schools. Similarly, the researchers studying the 
early results of Indiana’s voucher program observed that some 
schools did an excellent job of helping students who transferred 
catch up to their peers education deficits; others failed the transfer 
students in the same situation.92 Since it seems incontrovertible 
that school quality is one of the most important factors driving stu-
dent performance, the question of whether and how the law 
should address the problem of poorly performing schools partici-
pating in parental-choice programs would persist even in the face 
of solid evidence that parental choice improves students’ academic 
performance overall. The remainder of this article tackles this 
question.
III. ACADEMIC ACCOUNTABILITY POLICIES
As previously discussed, parental-choice policies were originally 
justified as a means of holding public schools accountable by sub-
jecting them to competition. Yet, although the available evidence 
suggests that competition does, in fact, improve public-school per-
formance,93 parental choice has never taken center stage as a pub-
lic-school-accountability device. Instead, as discussed briefly below, 
accountability policies have sought to improve public schools from 
within through a complex system of command-and-control regula-
tions, penalties, and rewards. Moreover, while early parental-choice 
proponents assumed that it would be unnecessary to use the law to 
hold chosen schools accountable for student performance, current 
89. See Ray Fisman, Do Charter Schools Work? Yes, but not always for everyone, SLATE (May 
22, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_dismal_science/2013/05/
do_charter_schools_work_a_new_study_of_boston_schools_says_yes.html.
90. CTR. FOR RESEARCH OF EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
2017 20–36 (2017), https://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/CMO%20FINAL.pdf.
91. Id. at 34–35. (For example, schools in for-profit charter networks consistently un-
derperformed independent charter schools and traditional public schools.)
92. Waddington & Berends, supra note 87.
93. See studies cited supra note 10 (each examining effect of competition on public 
schools’ academic performance).
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parental-choice debates frequently feature demands to import the 
tools of public-school accountability into choice contexts.
A. Public-School Accountability Policies
The academic “accountability” movement did not reach matura-
tion until a decade after parental choice took hold in Wisconsin 
(with vouchers) and Minnesota (with charters), when Congress 
enacted the now-defunct No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
(NCLB).94 NCLB imposed a number of measures designed to hold 
states, districts, and schools accountable for student performance. 
It required states to administer standardized tests aligned with state 
academic standards in reading and mathematics and to make “ad-
equate yearly progress” toward bringing all students to proficiency 
by the 2013-2014 school year.95 Further, NCLB included both car-
rots and sticks to hold schools and school districts accountable for 
standardized test scores, graduation rates, and other measurable 
objectives set by individual states.96 For example, failing schools re-
ceived additional funds for supplemental education services, such 
as tutoring, but were also required to develop a plan for improve-
ment and to permit students to transfer to higher-performing 
schools. After a school failed to make adequate yearly progress for 
five years, districts were required to select from an array of punitive 
options, including closing the school or converting it into a charter 
school.97
Not only did NCLB’s goal of universal proficiency prove unreal-
istic,98 but the law also fueled a widespread backlash against stand-
94. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6319 (repealed 2015); see also Janet 
T. Thomas & Kevin P. Brady, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act at 40: Equity, Account-
ability, and the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education, 29 REV. RES. EDUC. 51 (2005).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(F) (2006) (repealed Dec. 10, 2015) (“Each State shall estab-
lish a timeline for adequate yearly progress. The timeline shall ensure that not later than 12 
years after the end of the 2001-2002 school year, all students . . . will meet or exceed the 
State’s proficient level of academic achievements on the State assessments . . . .”).
96. No Child Left Behind, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/ew/
issues/no-child-left-behind/ http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/no-child-left-behind/.
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(5). Beginning in 2007, the Department of Education’s School 
Improvement Grant (SIG) program provided grants to states to fund school district inter-
ventions to turn around low-achieving schools identified under the NCLB accountability 
system, including by closing and converting them to a charter school. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
GUIDANCE ON FISCAL YEAR 2010 SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS, at xvii (2012).
98. Anya Kamenetz, It’s 2014. All Children Are Supposed To Be Proficient. What Happened?,
NPR EDUC. (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ed/2014/10/11/354931351/it-s-
2014-all-children-are-supposed-to-be-proficient-under-federal-law. (In 2014, the established 
deadline achieving universal proficiency, “proficiency” rates were below fifty percent in both 
reading and math, in both fourth and eighth grade for all demographic groups except for 
Asian students, in all subjects, and white students in 4th grade math.).
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ardized testing.99 When President Obama entered office, he and 
his Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, began to move away 
from NCLB’s accountability devices toward other reform measures 
that they believed would more effectively promote academic gains 
and address the achievement gap. Their first opportunity to do so 
came with the enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act (more commonly known as the Stimulus Act), which ap-
propriated funds to promote school improvement.100 Race to the 
Top, the program devised by the Obama administration to distrib-
ute these funds established a competitive process requiring states 
to submit reform proposals meeting certain criteria.101 These crite-
ria included “ensuring successful conditions for high-performing 
charter schools and other innovative schools,” such as eliminating
numerical caps on charter schools, funding equalization between 
traditional public and charter schools, and adopting regulations 
holding charter schools accountable for academic performance,
including by closing underperforming schools.102 In 2011, the De-
partment of Education went further and invited states to request 
waivers from ten of the NCLB’s school-accountability require-
ments, including the unpopular “adequate yearly progress” man-
date. The Department of Education justified these waivers by the 
need to reward states for initiating “ground breaking reforms and 
innovations,”103 including the implementation of the Common 
Core State Standards104 and value-added principal- and teacher-
evaluation metrics.105 The waiver policy also required states to spec-
ify a plan of action for improving student achievement and holding 
districts accountable for school turnarounds, including converting 
failing schools into charter schools.106
99. See generally DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 201 (2000).
100. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §14001, 123 
Stat. 115, 279 (2012).
101. Id. § 14005. (other criteria included “articulating a comprehensive a coherent re-
form agenda,” developing and adopting “common” standards and assessments, a tacit refer-
ence to the development of the Common Core State Standards, using data to support class-
room instruction, implementing data-driven teacher-evaluation and compensation 
procedures).
102. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Nov. 
2009), http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
103. Letter from Arne Duncan, Sec. of Educ., to Chief State Sch. Officers (Sept. 23, 
2011), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/110923.html.
104. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY (2016), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/
elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html (explaining the Department of Education expressly 
disavowed “requiring” the adoption of the Common Core as a condition of receiving a waiv-
er).
105. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY REQUEST (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/
policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html.
106. Id.
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The future of public-school accountability policies is currently in 
flux. In December 2015—eight years after the date of NCLB’s ex-
piration—Congress signed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA). 
ESSA eliminated many of NCLB’s most unpopular requirements, 
including the requirement that schools and districts make “ade-
quate yearly progress” toward proficiency. Although ESSA still re-
quires that schools test students annually and disclose information 
about school performance, it gives states more latitude to select 
from a range of standardized tests and also mandates that account-
ability measures incorporate at least one measure of school quality 
other than test scores.107 States were required to submit a plan to 
the United States Department of Education outlining their new ac-
countability regimes under ESSA by September 2017. These plans 
suggest that most states will continue to rate schools’ overall per-
formance based on standardized test scores, with some issuing 
“grades” (that is, A–F) and others dividing schools into perfor-
mance tiers.108 States have proposed a wide variety of noncognitive 
measures of school performance, ranging from absenteeism to col-
lege readiness to enrollment in the arts.109
It is unclear at this point how the transition to ESSA’s more flex-
ible accountability regime will affect state accountability practices 
that were encouraged by the NCLB waiver process, including 
school closures and regulations employing charter school conver-
sions as a school-turnaround device. Although neither NCLB nor 
the Race to the Top Program directly triggered many school clo-
sures,110 the Obama administration provided financial support for 
charter conversions and encouraged them through the waiver pro-
cess. At least twenty of the forty-five successful applications for 
NCLB waivers included some meaningful mention of either turn-
ing failing public schools over to outside management or restarting 
them as charter schools.111 While the waivers were eliminated by 
107. See What’s in the Every Student Succeeds Act?, THE EDUC. TR. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://
edtrust.org/resource/whats-in-the-every-student-succeeds-act-accountability/. The legisla-
tion also eliminates all ESEA waivers. See Dear Colleague Letter on the Transition to ESSA, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/transition-
dcl.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Approved ESSA Plans: Explainer and Key Takewaways from Each State, EDUC. WK. (Apr. 
21, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/section/multimedia/key-takeaways-state-essa-plans.
html.
110. See JENNIFER MCMURRER & SHELBY MCINTOSH, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF TITLE I SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS UNDER THE 
RECOVERY ACT 2 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT: VOLUME IX—ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER NCLB; FINAL REPORT 
(2010).
111. MELISSA LAZARIN, CHARTING NEW TERRITORY: TAPPING CHARTER SCHOOLS TO TURN 
AROUND THE NATION’S DROPOUT FACTORIES 1 (2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/
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ESSA, the new law increases funding for charter schools and au-
thorizes (but does not require) states to use these funds to convert 
failing public schools to charter schools.112 Many states have adopt-
ed statutes that permit or encourage districts to convert failing 
public schools to charter schools, and several states have enacted a 
“parent trigger” law, which gives parents the option of converting 
their children’s schools to a charter school under certain circum-
stances. A number of other states are actively considering parent 
trigger statutes.113 While these laws remain unaffected by ESSA, no 
state makes such conversions mandatory.114 In addition, a number 
of states’ ESSA plans list the closure of failing public (and charter) 
schools and/or the conversion of these schools to a charter school 
(or transfer to a new charter operator in the case of a failing char-
ter school) among a range of potential accountability devices—
although, again, no state makes closure and/or conversion manda-
tory.115
wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/06/pdf/charter_schools.pdf). See also James Cersonsky, A
Lesson for Arne Duncan, THE NATION (Sept. 26, 2012).
112. See Charter Schools and the Every Student Succeeds Act, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCHOOLS, (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/V3-NAPCS-ESSA-Charter-Overview-Webinar-01.07.15-updated.pdf,
113. Josh Cunningham, Parent Trigger Laws in the States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/state-parent-
trigger-laws.aspx; In Your State, PARENT TRIGGER, http://theparenttrigger.com/in-your-
state/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
114. See Educ. Comm. of the States, Charter Schools: Does the State Allow Existing Public 
Schools to Convert to Charter Schools?, http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=
CS1502.
115. See, e.g., ARK. DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT ARKANSAS STATE PLAN 69–
70 (2018); COLO. DEP’T EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) 86 (2017); CONN. DEP’T EDUC., CONNECTICUT CONSOLIDATED STATE 
PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 30 (2017); OFFICE OF THE STATE 
SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUC., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR THE 
CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 36 (2017) (“Unless specifically submitted as a proposal by the 
LEA of the identified school, the state-selected intervention would not include school clo-
sure.”); FLA. DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) STATE PLAN SUBMITTED TO 
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 28 (2017); GA. DEP’T EDUC., EDUCATING 
GEORGIA’S FUTURE: GEORGIA’S STATE PLAN FOR THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 54–55 
(2017); LA. DEP’T EDUC., LOUISIANA BELIEVES: LOUISIANA’S ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUCATION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) 69 
(2017); MINN. DEP’T EDUC., MINNESOTA’S CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY 
STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) TIT. I, PT. A: SCHOOL SUPPORT, at 3 (2018); NEV. DEP’T
EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 69–70 (2017); 
N.M. DEP’T EDUC., NEW MEXICO RISING: NEW MEXICO’S STATE PLAN FOR THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT 91 (2017); N.Y. DEP’T EDUC., REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR THE 
CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 103 (2018); N.C. DEP’T EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 50 
(2017); OHIO DEP’T EDUC., REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 51
(2018); OKLA. DEP’T EDUC., OKLAHOMA ESSA CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 183 (2017); PA.
DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: PENNSYLVANIA CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 65
(2018); P.R. DEP’T EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 107 (2018); R.I. DEP’T EDUC., RHODE 
ISLAND’S EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT STATE PLAN FOR SUBMISSION TO U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION 42–43 (2017); TENN. DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: BUILDING 
ON SUCCESS IN TENNESSEE 107–08 (2017); TEX. DEP’T EDUC., REVISED TEMPLATE FOR THE 
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B. Parental Choice and Accountability
In many ways, NCLB discredited the efforts to hold public 
schools accountable for students’ performance. By eliminating 
these requirements in ESSA, Congress effectively acknowledged 
that the NCLB had failed. But the demise of NCLB should not be 
equated with the demise of school accountability policies. When 
viewed as a measuring stick for the possibility of reforming failing 
public schools, NCLB’s optics are bad. ESSA gives states more flex-
ibility over school-level accountability, not because public schools’
persistent struggles have been solved, but because NCLB’s ac-
countability regime did little to solve them. This failure highlight-
ed the difficulties plaguing school turnaround efforts and, by so 
doing, fueled the demand for parental choice. After all, if public 
schools cannot be reformed from within, should students not be 
given options other than public schools?116
Of course, if the goal of parental choice is to give students access 
to higher-performing alternatives to traditional public schools, 
then the performance of those alternatives necessarily comes un-
der scrutiny and demands for legal policies regulating the quality 
of chosen schools inevitably follows. Accountability proponents ar-
gue that more rigorous accountability measures are needed to en-
sure that parental choice delivers on its equality-of-opportunity 
promises; skeptics counter that additional regulations threaten to 
import into the charter and private-school sectors the very bureau-
CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 28–29 (2017); UTAH DEP’T EDUC., REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR 
THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 50–51 (2017); VT. DEP’T EDUC., REVISED STATE TEMPLATE 
FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 75–76 (2017); WASH DEP’T EDUC., WASHINGTON’S ESSA
CONSOLIDATED PLAN 66–67 (2018).
116. From the ECS State Policy Database: Accountability—Sanctions/Interventions, EDUC.
COMMISSION OF THE STATES http://b5.caspio.com/dp.asp?AppKey=b7f93000695b3d0d5abb
4b68bd14&id=a0y70000000CblSAAS (last visited Sept. 25, 2018); see e.g., FLA. STAT.
§§ 1008.33(4)(b)(1)–(5) (2012)(allowing a school district to either take over the school, 
“[r]eassign students to another school,” close and reopen the school as a charter school, 
contract with a private management company, or any other model “that [has] a demonstrat-
ed record of effectiveness”); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, §§ 1.85(e)(1)–(4) (2012) (“Each 
school restructuring plan shall indicate that the district is undertaking one or more of the 
following actions in the affected school: 1) reopening the school as a public charter 
school.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 69, § 1J(o) (listing sixteen possible actions that a superinten-
dent may take with respect to a persistently low-performing school); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 380.1280c(2) (2011) (“The redesign plan shall require implementation of [one] of the 
[four] school intervention models that are provided for the lowest achieving schools under 
the federal incentive grant program . . . known as the ‘race to the top’ grant program.”); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-105.37B(a) (2012) (stating that “the State Board of Education may 
authorize [a] local board of education to adopt” the transformation, restart, turnaround, or 
closure model).
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cratic controls that choice was intended to render obsolete.117 Thus 
far, the skeptics appear to have held the line. Although the nature 
and extent of accountability measures vary dramatically across a 
number of variables, chosen schools—especially private schools 
participating in choice programs—tend to be subject to far less ex-
tensive accountability regulation than traditional public schools.
1. Academic Accountability and Private-School Choice
All private-school-choice programs regulate the quality of 
schools by mandating certain predictive “inputs.” For example, all 
programs require, at a minimum, that participating private schools 
comply with state regulations of private schools generally. Many 
limit participation to accredited schools118 and/or establish mini-
mum qualification requirements for teachers119—usually a bache-
lor’s degree and/or substantial teaching experience.120 A handful 
of programs establish basic curricular minimums beyond those re-
quired of nonparticipating private schools, such as civic and char-
acter education.121 Many, but not all, private-school-choice pro-
grams also seek to hold participating schools accountable for 
certain academic outcomes. Many require participating schools to 
take either a state criterion-referenced or nationally normed 
standardized test and report the results to state regulators.122 A
number of programs also mandate that schools communicate with 
parents about students’ progress.123
117. See David Stuit & Sy Doan, School Choice Regulations: Red Tape or Red Herring?,
FORDHAM INST. (Jan. 2013), https://edexcellence.net/publications/red-tape-or-red-
herring.html.
118. See SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 48 (Alabama), 55 (Arkansas); 60 
(Georgia); 60 (Indiana); 64 (Iowa); 70 (Mississippi); 78 (North Caroline); 92 (South Caroli-
na); 97 (Virginia); 100 (Wisconsin).
119. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 80–84. (explaining that teacher certifi-
cation is not required by any program, Ohio requires all schools participating in voucher 
programs to have a principal licensed by the state).
120. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 57 (Florida); 60 (Georgia); 91 (Rhode 
Island); 98 (D.C.); 100 (Wisconsin).
121. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 60 (Indiana); 66 (Louisiana); 74 (Ne-
vada); 92 (South Carolina); 100 (Wisconsin).
122. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 55 (Arkansas); 58 (Florida); 62 (Indi-
ana); 66 (Louisiana); 73 (Montana); 74 (Nevada); 78 (North Carolina); 80 (Ohio); 98 (Dis-
trict of Columbia). Wisconsin requires high schools participating in the Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program to administer the ACT and a civics exam, id. at 103, Ohio requires all stu-
dents to take the state high-school graduation exam, id. at 80, and Alabama, North Carolina, 
and Virginia require schools participating in its scholarship tax credit program to report 
graduation rates to the state. Id. at 49, 78, 97.
123. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 49 (Alabama); 58 (Florida); 71 (Missis-
sippi); 73 (Montana); 78 (NC); 96 (Utah); 103 (Wisconsin).
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Two states’ voucher programs—Indiana and Louisiana—
preclude schools falling below a certain performance threshold 
from accepting new scholarship students. In Indiana, all schools 
participating in the Choice Scholarship Program receive an A-F
grade based upon student performance on the state exam. Schools 
receiving a D or an F for two or more consecutive years may not 
accept new scholarship students until the school’s grade rises to a 
C or above for two years.124 Each school participating in Louisiana’s
Student Scholarship for Educational Excellence Program receives 
a “scholarship cohort index” based upon performance on the 
states’ exam. Schools must receive a score of fifty or above to re-
main eligible to admit new recipients.125
2. Academic Accountability and Charter Schools
Although charter schools are designated as public schools in all 
state statutes, they operate autonomously from local districts. In
fact, they are considered their own school district—or “local edu-
cation agency” in federal education parlance—in a majority of 
states.126 To encourage educational innovation, states also automat-
ically exempt charter schools from many state and local education 
regulations, including, importantly, teacher collective bargaining
requirements and certain mandatory curriculum requirements.127
That said, the accountability requirements in most state charter 
school laws are more comprehensive than those imposed upon 
schools participating in private-school-choice programs. For exam-
ple, roughly half of state charter school laws require charter-school 
teachers to have the same licensure and certification as public-
school teachers, a third require some percentage of teachers in a 
school to be certified (varying between thirty and ninety percent), 
and the remainder do not require licensure at all.128 Especially af-
124. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 60.
125. SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8, at 66.
126. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, Measuring Up to the Model: A Rank-
ing of State Charter School Laws 11 (2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Model-Law-Final_2016.pdf.
127. Id. at 9 (summarizing state charter school requirements addressing these issues).
128. Teacher certification is a hotly contested issue in the charter-school context. While 
teacher unions demand universal teacher certification requirements across sectors, charter-
school proponents object that teacher certification requirements disfavor (or preclude) 
schools from hiring highly qualified college graduates with subject matter expertise who 
lack education degrees. (Some state laws require a degree in education as a condition of 
certification.) Until recently, the federal charter-school program required schools to hire 
only certified teachers as a condition of receiving federal funds. Congress’s decision to drop 
the certification requirement—known as the “highly qualified teacher requirement”—in 
ESSA was heralded as a victory by charter-school proponents. See Stephen Sawchuk, ESSA
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ter the enactment of ESSA, most states require charter schools to
undergo the same accreditation procedures as public schools,129 to 
administer the same standardized tests,130 to admit students based 
upon a randomized lottery if demand exceeds capacity,131 and to 
serve at least some range of students with special needs in the same 
manner as public schools.132
Federal law also imposes accountability requirements on charter 
schools through the Charter Schools Program, which provides fed-
eral funds to states to create new charter schools, disseminate in-
formation about charter schools, replicate and expand high quality 
charter schools, and help find and fund facilities for charter 
schools.133 In keeping with the devolution of authority for account-
ability to states, ESSA eliminated many of the conditions placed on 
charter school funding in NCLB, giving the states relatively broad 
autonomy to set their own accountability measures. ESSA further
establishes charter school autonomy as a specific goal, prioritizing
funding states that give charter schools operational autonomy and 
treat charter schools and traditional public schools equitably in 
terms of funding.134 However, in exchange, ESSA requires that 
charter schools be treated the same as traditional public schools 
with respect to reporting regulations and prioritizes funding for 
states that adopt accountability policies that guarantee state over-
Loosens Reins on Teacher Evaluations, Qualifications, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 28, 2016), https://
www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/01/06/essa-loosens-reins-on-teacher-evaluations-
qualifications.html; Charter Schools One Step Closer to Big Win with Senate Passage of ESSA, NAT’L
ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/
press/charter-schools-step-closer-big-win-senate-passage-essa/.
129. See Educ. Comm’n of the States, Charter School Accountability Under ESSA 2 (May 
2017), https://www.ecs.org/wp-content/uploads/Charter_School_Accountability_Under_
ESSA-1.pdf.
130. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., CHARTER SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY (April 
2014), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Charter-Schools-are-
Accountable.pdf.
131. Measuring Up to the Model, supra note 126, at 11.
132. Charter schools serve fewer special needs students than public schools, and the 
question of why is hotly contested. While charter schools are bound by the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (and private schools are not), the federal law allows states to make 
alternative arrangements for disabled children. While critics allege that charter schools in-
tentionally exclude or expel disabled students disproportionately, see Stephani Blanchero & 
Caroline Porter, Charter Schools Fall Short on Disabled, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2012), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303379204577477003893836734, supporters argue 
that charter schools are less likely to diagnose students with minor learning disabilities, see
Marcus A. Winters, Why the Gap? Special Education and New York City Charter Schools,
MANHATTAN INST. (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/why-gap-
special-education-and-new-york-city-charter-schools-5862.html.
133. Charter Schools Homepage, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oii/csp/index.html?exp=6.
134. James Davis O’Leary, Revamp of Charter Schools Incentivizes Mostly the Right Things, 
FLYPAPER BLOG (May 3, 2016), http://edexcellence.net/articles/revamp-of-charter-schools-
program-incentivizes-mostly-the-right-things#_ftn).
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sight over charter-school performance.135 Furthermore, ESSA gives 
the federal Department of Education more direct oversight to en-
sure that federal funds are only distributed to schools meeting the 
statute’s definition of a “High Quality Charter School.”136 Im-
portantly, states are required—as a condition of receiving funding 
through the federal Charter Schools Program—to report perfor-
mance information about charter schools in the same way as tradi-
tional public schools, a requirement discussed in more detail be-
low.137 ESSA does not specifically mandate that any punitive steps 
be taken against failing charter schools, although states must inter-
vene to address the performance of traditional public and charter 
schools scoring in the bottom five percent of state accountability 
metrics or falling below a sixty-seven percent graduation rate.138
A major distinction between accountability in charter-school
programs versus private-school-choice programs is that all charter 
schools are—at least theoretically—at risk of being closed for un-
derperformance. This is not the case in any private-school-choice 
program, although two programs (Indiana and Louisiana) do pre-
clude struggling schools from accepting new scholarship recipi-
ents, as discussed above. Charter-school laws expose failing schools 
to closure in two ways: through the authorization process itself and, 
in a handful of states, through mandatory-closure laws. All charter 
schools are, by definition, subject to periodic review and renewal 
by charter authorizers since the terms of charters are limited, rang-
ing from three to fifteen years.139 In theory, authorizers can and 
should monitor charter-school performance and refuse to renew 
the charters of persistently failing schools, and a number of states 
require that all charters include performance-based criteria gov-
erning authorizer review of charter schools.140 Concern that au-
thorizers sometimes fail to monitor charter-school performance 
adequately has led a number of states to enact laws that either au-
135. Charter Schools and the Every Student Succeeds Act, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER 
SCHOOLS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
NAPCS_ESSA_Charter_Overview_Webinar_01.07.15.pdf) http://www.publiccharters.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NAPCS-ESSA-Overview-Webinar-3.10.2016.pdf.
136. This definition turns on student proficiency, growth, and other academic indica-
tors. Id.




139. 50 State Comparison: Charter Schools, EDUC. COMMISSION OF THE STATES (June 2014), 
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1401.
140. Measuring Up to the Model, supra note 126, at 8, 10.
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tomatically close persistently failing schools or require authorizers 
to do so.141
A second major distinction between accountability in the pri-
vate-school choice and charter-school contexts is the question of 
authorizer accountability. Recall that charter schools are technically 
created by an agreement, a charter, between the authorizer and
the school operator. These agreements, which are, as discussed 
above, reviewed periodically, set the basic operating procedures of 
a school, as well as the criteria that the authorizer will use to evalu-
ate the school’s performance. Authorizers are expected to provide 
oversight and technical assistance to the schools that they author-
ize and to ensure compliance with state and federal laws, in addi-
tion to the terms of the charter.142 The regulation of authorizers is 
a highly contested issue in charter-school policy. While charter ad-
vocates strongly support laws permitting multiple authorizers,143
critics express concern that states that permit a broad array of or-
ganizations to act as charter-school authorizers (for example, state 
charter boards, mayors, colleges and universities, and even non-
profit entities) may invite “authorizer shopping,” with subpar char-
ter schools seeking the authorizer that will provide the least 
amount of scrutiny or switching authorizers to avoid closure.144
Charter advocates strongly objected to federal regulations imple-
menting ESSA, which calls for all charter authorizers to be treated 
the same as, and made subject to the same federal accountability 
requirements as, school districts.145
141. The precise terms of these mandatory closure rules vary. See 50 State Comparison: 
Charter Schools – Does the State Set a Threshold Beneath which a School Must Automatically Be 
Closed?, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES (Jan. 2016), http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/
mbquestNB2?rep=CS1515; Todd Ziebarth, Automatic Closure of Low-Performing Public Charter 
Schools, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS (Sept. 2015), http://
www.publiccharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/policy_snapshot_autoclosure_
web.pdf?x87663.
142. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 11 (2014), 
http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf.
143. NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, POLICY GUIDE: MULTIPLE CHARTER 
AUTHORIZING OPTIONS (July 2009), http://www.qualitycharters.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/PolicyGuide_MultipleCharterAuthorizingOptions_2009.07.pdf.
144. LYRIA BOAST ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, AUTHORIZER 
SHOPPING: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE AND IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE (2016), http://
www.qualitycharters.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Authorizer_Shopping_Lessons_
Ideas.pdf. In response to this concern, proponents of stronger accountability within the 
charter sector, including charter-school advocates and authorizers, have sought to focus on 
reforms that ensure that all authorizers are adequately funded and supervised. See, e.g.,
Measuring up to the Model, supra note 126.
145. ESEA of 1965, as Amended by ESSA—Accountability and State Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 
86,160 (Nov. 29, 2016), proposed for codification at 34 C.F.R. § 200.23(c)(1)), reserved 
by 82 Fed. Reg. 31,696. “One commentator [on the regulation] asserted that the proposed 
regulation confused the roles of charter authorizers and charter operators, noting that au-
thorizers are limited to monitoring school performance and using their nonrenewal and 
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
PARENTAL-CHOICE CONTEXTS
As previously discussed, the participation of poorly performing 
schools in charter-school and private-school-choice programs is ar-
guably disconsonant with what has become the central goal of pa-
rental choice: improving the quality of educational opportunities 
available to disadvantaged children. If parental choice is, in the 
words of Howard Fuller, a “rescue mission” to “save” students by 
empowering them to exit bad schools and enroll in good ones, 
permitting bad schools to be among the range of options available 
to participating students is deeply problematic. Using the law to 
hold chosen schools accountable for their academic results—to the 
point of closing failing charter schools and excluding persistently 
failing private schools from participating in parental-choice pro-
grams—can be seen as a policy imperative.
That said, significant public choice and institutional design chal-
lenges haunt accountability efforts in the parental-choice context. 
This Part discusses four of these challenges: First, public choice 
theory and lived experience suggest that proponents of traditional 
public schools may seek to use the mantra of “accountability” to 
control and/or suppress their competition. Second, the twin goals 
of parental-choice programs—to increase the number and quality 
of options available to disadvantaged students—come into tension 
in the accountability context. Third, selection-bias difficulties per-
vade efforts to compare the performance of students participating 
in parental-choice programs vis-à-vis their traditional public-school 
peers. Finally, most accountability metrics rely heavily on standard-
ized test scores, which fail to capture important noncognitive indi-
cia of school quality, including many that parents value highly.
A. The Political Economy of Accountability Policies
The first and perhaps most significant challenge to designing 
optimal accountability policies for chosen schools is politics. Both 
public choice theory and lived experience strongly suggest that the 
primary proponents of holding chosen schools accountable for 
their performance—and excluding failing schools from participat-
ing in parental-choice programs—are opponents of parental 
choice. Indeed, these opponents’ first line of argument is not that 
chosen schools should be held accountable for academic perfor-
charter revocation authority to close low-performing schools, rather than providing support 
and intervention to such schools.” 81 Fed. Reg. 86, 160.
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mance, but rather that charter schools and private-school choice 
programs should be dramatically limited or quashed altogether. 
Assertions that public funds should be invested exclusively in tradi-
tional public schools because parental choice “doesn’t work” per-
vade education policy debates.146 Any study of a parental-choice 
program suggesting tepid or negative results presents an oppor-
tunity to bludgeon the very idea of parental choice, and examples 
of individual school failures inevitably are held up as an exemplar 
of the folly of parental choice.147
Relatedly, public-school proponents frequently argue that char-
ter schools and private-school choice should be suppressed be-
cause these programs divert students and resources away from pub-
lic schools.148 Diane Ravitch, a former supporter of parental choice, 
dedicates her widely read blog to fighting “privatization” of public 
schools and the draining of public resources to charter and private 
schools through choice programs.149 Others take a more conciliato-
ry approach, while still insisting that accountability policies limit 
the competitive effect parental choice and charter schools have on 
traditional public schools. For example, in 2016, the Annenberg 
Institute for School Reform issued a report entitled Public Account-
ability and Charter Schools, that recommended that charter schools 
and district schools should be required to develop a citywide plan 
that ensures, among other things, that charter schools do not neg-
atively affect district schools. The report further recommended 
that proposed charter schools be required to prepare and submit a 
report assessing the new schools’ effect on existing district schools.
It also recommended that state departments of education be re-
146. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, NAACP Sticks by its Call for Charter School Moratorium, Says 




147. See, e.g., Noah Smith, School Choice Fails to Make a Difference, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 
12, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-12/school-choice-lotteries-
fail-to-make-a-difference; Valerie Strauss, Separating Fact from Fiction in 21 Claims about Charter 
Schools, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/
wp/2015/02/28/separating-fact-from-fiction-in-21-claims-about-charter-schools/?utm_term=
.a435f7b6b88c.
148. See, e.g., Natalie Hopkinson, Why School Choice Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/opinion/why-school-choice-fails.html.
149. See generally DIANE RAVITCH’S BLOG: A SITE TO DISCUSS BETTER EDUCATION FOR ALL,
https://dianeravitch.net/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2018). See also Sol Stern, The Closing of Diane 
Ravitch’s Mind: A Once-Great Education Scholar Rejects Everything She Previously Believed, CITY J.
(Autumn 2013), https://www.city-journal.org/html/closing-diane-ravitch%E2%80%99s-
mind-13600.html.
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quired to conduct an annual assessment of the “cumulative impact 
of charter schools on traditional school districts.”150
Moreover, in education policy debates, calls for holding schools 
accountable for academic performance are often conflated with calls for 
holding chosen schools accountable to local public schools. For exam-
ple, a recent report by the NAACP demanded “more robust char-
ter-school accountability measures” demands that only public-
school districts be permitted to authorize charter schools, that 
charter schools hire only certified teachers, and that state funding 
systems eliminate “the potential negative fiscal impacts on neigh-
borhood schools of additional costs associated with charters,”
among its recommendations.151 The demands to limit authoriza-
tion to public-school districts frequently is presented as a way to 
limit the “authorizer shopping” discussed previously.152 Charter-
school skeptics Preston Green, Bruce Baker, Joseph Oluwole, and 
Julie Mead have compared charter schools to the subprime mort-
gage crises, analogizing non-local authorizers to mortgage loan 
originators.”153
The difficulty with the recommendation to limit authorization 
authority to school districts is that local school boards are usually
reluctant to approve new charter schools that will compete with 
them. This reality is demonstrated by the fact that states that limit 
authorizer authority to local school boards have few charter 
schools. Compare, for example, two states with authorization lim-
ited to school districts—Iowa (3 charter schools) and Virginia (7
charter schools)—with two that decouple authorization and local 
control—Arizona (623 charter schools) and Ohio (384 charter 
schools).154 In some cases, local school boards are quite forthcom-
ing about the fact that the suppression of competition is a major 
factor in authorization decisions. In 2015, the Philadelphia School 
Reform Commission voted to authorize the first new charter
schools since 2007. The hearings on thirty-nine charter applica-
tions lasted for hours and featured angry testimony on both sides.
Parents lamented the lack of high-quality schools available to their 
kids and pointed to long charter waitlists, while public-school offi-
150. ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 4 (2014),
http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files/CharterAccountabilityStds.pdf.
151. NAACP TASK FORCE ON QUALITY EDUC., QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL. . . ONE 
SCHOOL AT A TIME 28 (July 2017), http://www.naacp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
Task_ForceReport_final2.pdf.
152. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
153. See Preston C. Green III et al., Are We Heading Toward a Charter School “Bubble”?: Les-
sons from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 783 (2016).
154. Nat’l Ass’n of Charter Sch. Authorizers, State-by-State Authorizer Data and Policy Infor-
mation, http://www.qualitycharters.org/policy-research/state-policy-agenda/.
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cials expressed concern that the cash-strapped district could not 
afford to lose any students to new charter schools. By the time of 
the debate, the Governor of Pennsylvania and five of the six 
mayoral candidates called for a moratorium on charter schools un-
til the district had solved its financial crisis. Governor Wolf lament-
ed that he “continue[d] to believe that the district’s financial situa-
tion cannot responsibly handle the approval of new charter 
schools.” Ultimately, the Commission denied thirty-four of thirty-
nine applications.155
Calls for greater democratic accountability over charter schools 
are about more than the suppression of competition, to be sure. 
For example, within the African-American community, charter 
schools are a bitterly divisive issue. Some reformers argue that 
charter-school policies effectively disenfranchise African-American 
communities by wresting control of public education from school 
boards; others see offering students choices outside traditional 
public schools as the best way to address the chronic mismanage-
ment and woeful academic performance of urban public schools.156
The former position was reflected by the NAACP report discussed 
above,157 which in turn prompted strong negative reactions from 
other African-American leaders.158 Even ardent supporters of pa-
rental choice have expressed concern about, in the words of How-
ard Fuller, the sense among many African Americans that the edu-
cation reform happens “to us and not with us.”159 This debate 
played out in a particularly vivid way in New Orleans, where a state 
entity, the Recovery School District, had wrested control of almost 
all public schools and, effectively, converted the city to an all-
charter district after Hurricane Katrina. In 2016, the Louisiana leg-
islature responded to the political pressure to restore local control 
of the New Orleans schools, passing legislation that will transfer 
supervision of the nearly all-charter district to the Orleans Parish 
155. SRC approves five new charter schools, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 19, 2015), http://
www.philly.com/philly/education/20150219_SRC_approves_five_new_charter_schools.
html.
156. See, e.g., Anya Kamentz, Questions of Race and Charter Schools Divide Education Reform-
ers, NPR.ORG (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/30/494606061/
questions-of-race-and-charter-schools-divide-education-reformers.
157. NAACP TASK FORCE ON QUALITY EDUC., supra note 151.
158. T. Willard Fair, School Choice is Crucial for African-American Students’ Success, USA
TODAY (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/09/21/school-
choice-crucial-african-american-students-success-t-willard-fair-column/665451001/.
159. Jon Valant, Charter Schools and Local Control in New Orleans, BROWN CTR.
CHALKBOARD (May 18, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/
2016/05/18/charter-schools-and-local-control-in-new-orleans/.
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School Board by 2019—a move that has generated anxiety among 
choice proponents.160
The tensions in New Orleans, which have been building for over 
a decade, reflect broader political developments that may heighten 
the risk that accountability regulations may be employed to sup-
press parental choice. Until recently, a tacit political truce long ex-
isted between supporters of traditional public schools and propo-
nents of charter schools. Charter schools were historically 
promoted as a modest and constrained version of parental choice 
and enjoyed broad bipartisan support. Within debates about edu-
cational finance, moderate reformers advocated charter schools as 
an alternative to private-school-choice programs, such as tax credits 
or vouchers.161 In recent years, however, the truce between charter 
schools and public schools has unraveled as charter market share 
has grown, and public schools have faced enrollment declines as a 
result.162
Finally, and importantly, proponents of traditional public 
schools frequently advocate more stringent and more punitive ac-
countability policies for charter schools and private schools than 
those governing public schools. Mandatory closure and exclusion 
policies are cases in point. For example, for all of the frustration 
generated by the NCLB accountability process, that law was always 
more carrot than stick. In theory, the law encouraged school dis-
tricts to close persistently failing public schools. In practice, state 
and local officials usually eschewed more draconian measures such 
as closing and/or restarting persistently failing schools. While it is 
true that closing public schools for underperformance has been on 
the rise since NCLB, the available data suggests that forces other 
than NCLB, especially the economic and demographic realities 
facing many urban districts, are driving school closures.163 In fact, 
under the NCLB regime, school closures and restarts were by far 
the least popular method of addressing failing schools, and the op-
160. See Danielle Dreilinger, New Orleans’ Katrina School Takeover to End, Legislature Decides,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 5, 2016), http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2016/05/new_
orleans_schools_reunify.html.
161. See, e.g., JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE 3
(2007).
162. See, e.g., Richard Whitmire, Charter School War could go National: Governor Andrew 
Cuomo is Winning the Battle in New York, but What about Your State?, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/04/01/bill-de-blasio-cuomo-charter-
schools-new-york-column/7158071/.
163. On public school closure trends, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Disparate Impact, School 
Closures, and Parental Choice, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 290–93 (2014) [hereinafter “Garnett, 
Disparate Impact”].
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tion of taking measures other than those specified in the law were 
the most popular.164
One of the reasons why NCLB resulted in so few school closures 
is that public-school proponents vehemently object to public 
schools closures on any ground, especially academic. Consider 
these examples: First, in 2012, Mother Jones, ran a feature-length ar-
ticle, Everything You’ve Heard about Failing Schools is Wrong, which ar-
gued that the standardized measures of student achievement are a 
farce and fail to capture the real positive trends in high-poverty 
schools.165 The National Education Association has publicly stated 
that closing public schools—even persistently failing ones—harms 
students.166 The conversion of failing public schools to charter 
schools, a reform strategy encouraged by federal and state law, is 
consistently characterized as a turnaround strategy that is doomed 
to fail.167 Even school districts’ decisions to close public schools on 
non-academic grounds, such as under-enrollment, inevitably spark 
controversy. When the Chicago Public Schools announced in 2013 
that the district would close or consolidate more than fifty low-
enrollment schools, weeks of protests ensued. Tellingly, the district 
insisted that it was not closing any of the schools for poor academic 
performance, although the school closure plan guaranteed all dis-
placed students a spot in a higher-performing school.168
States with mandatory closure and exclusion policies for choice 
and charter schools impose far more draconian penalties. NCLB’s
164. Although accurate data is difficult to obtain, these legal requirements apparently 
did not directly trigger many school closures. In 2007–2008, the Center on Education Policy 
found that 3,500 schools were “in” or “planning” “restructuring” as a result of NCLB. Unfor-
tunately, the high percentage of districts opting to employ “other” restructuring options, 
rather than the four set forth in NCLB, makes it difficult to determine what, exactly, “re-
structuring” meant in any given context. CT. ON EDUC. POLICY RESEARCH, A CALL TO 
RESTRUCTURE RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM THE NCLB ACT IN FIVE STATES (2008), 
http://www.cep-dc.org/displayDocument.cfm?DocumentID=175. A more recent report 
found that only fourteen states reported using the “closure” model and twelve using the “re-
start” model (usually the conversion to a charter school) to address failing schools. SARAH 
YATSKO ET AL., CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., TINKERING TOWARD TRANSFORMATION 3
(2012).
165. Kristina Rizga, Everything You’ve Heard about Failing Schools is Wrong, MOTHER JONES
(Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.motherjones.com/media/2012/08/mission-high-false-low-
performing-school/.
166. See CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, 2 LIGHTS OFF: PRACTICE AND IMPACT OF 
CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 21–23 (2017), http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/
Closure_FINAL_Volume_II.pdf (stating “in general and by sub-population, closures benefit-
ed the academic growth of students who landed in higher-performing schools but impaired 
the performance of students with equivalent or inferior school placement.”).
167. See, e.g., Eileen M. O’Brien & Charles J. Dervarics, Which Way Up? What Research Says 
About School Turnaround Strategies, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC. 2–3, (May 2013), http://
www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Policies/Which-Way-Up-At-a-glance/
Which-Way-Up-Full-Report.pdf.
168. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, School Closures as Education Reform: New Evidence from Chica-
go and Ohio, 9 J. SCH. CHOICE 649, 650 (summarizing policy).
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now-defunct accountability regime exposed schools to the possibility 
of closure if they fell into the bottom five percent of overall per-
formance for more than five years and gave district officials many 
options for addressing persistently failing schools other than clo-
sure.169 The Obama administration’s NCLB waiver policy also en-
couraged, but did not require, closing failing schools.170 Similarly, 
most state education regulations merely list the closure of a persis-
tently failing traditional public school (as well as, in appropriate 
cases, its conversion to a charter school) as an accountability op-
tion rather than dictate mandatory closure criteria.171 School clo-
sures and charter conversions remain a last resort in most states, 
although some districts exercise these options when other methods 
of intervention fail.172
Although a majority of schools closed for underperformance 
over the last ten years have been traditional public schools,173 low-
performing charter schools have been more likely to close than 
low-performing traditional public schools.174 Between 2006 and 
2013, 5.5 percent of low-performing charter schools closed, com-
pared to 3.2 percent of low-performing traditional public 
schools.175 There are several explanations for this pattern. First, au-
thorizers may be more vigilant than school districts in policing the 
quality of school because of reputational and institutional consid-
erations. Second, authorizers may face less political pressure to 
keep failing schools open and/or exhibit more resistance to such 
pressure. Third, several states mandate closing (or require author-
169. See Garnett, Disparate Impact, supra note 163, at 301–05.
170. Id. at 303.
171. See consolidated state plans cited supra note 115.
172. For example, one study of 100 school closures in Denver, Chicago, Hartford, and 
Pittsburgh between 2001 and 2007 found that academic performance generally was one of 
several factors influencing the districts’ decisions to close schools, along with budgetary and 
enrollment considerations, and that district officials universally reported turning to closure 
as only after other efforts to improve performance failed. See LUCY STEINER, TOUGH 
DECISIONS: CLOSING PERSISTENTLY LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 4 (2009), http://
www.centerii.org/survey/downloads/Tough_Decisions.pdf. A number of large urban dis-
tricts, including New York City, Chicago, Detroit, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia, have 
employed school closures aggressively as a tool to address academic underperformance. See 
Andy Smarick, The Turnaround Fallacy: Stop trying to fix failing schools. Close them and start fresh,
10 EDUC. NEXT 20, 21 (2010), http://educationnext.org/the-turnaround-fallacy/.
173. See CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, 1 LIGHTS OFF: PRACTICE AND IMPACT 
OF CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 4 (2017), http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/Closure_
FINAL_Volume_I.pdf. (“Although the number of charter closures was smaller than that of 
TPS closures, the percentage of low-performing schools getting closed what higher in the 
charter sector than in the TPS sector.”)
174. Id.
175. Id. at 21.
FALL 2018] Post-Accountability Accountability 195
izers to close) any persistently failing charter school,176 a position 
that is now supported by both the leading association of charter 
schools and the leading organization representing charter author-
izers.177
That said, closing failing schools appears most likely to boost 
student achievement only if the students exiting the closed schools 
subsequently enroll in higher-performing schools.178 Unfortunately, 
the overall effects of closing schools, both charter and public, for 
low performance appear to be negative, in large part because a ma-
jority of students displaced by school closures land in schools that 
are lower-performing than their previous school.179 This evidence 
strongly suggests the imperative of ensuring that accountability 
policies in charter and private-school-choice programs do not lead 
students to move from bad to worse educational environments. Ac-
countability policies that hold chosen schools to a higher standard 
than traditional public schools increase the risk that they will.180
B. More and Better Schools
As previously discussed, the animating goal of parental-choice 
policies is to improve students’ academic prospects by increasing 
both the quality and quantity of educational options available to 
them. Accountability policies focus on the quality variable in the 
parental-choice equation: They are seeking to ensure that the 
choices available to participating students are good ones. Unfortu-
nately, the goal of regulating the quality of students’ choices can 
come into tension with the goal of increasing the quantity of op-
tions available. In calling for more comprehensive accountability 
regulations in charter-school and private-school-choice programs, 
176. See Educ. Comm’n of the States, 50-State Comparison: Charter Schools—Does the State Set 
a Threshold Beneath Which a School Must Automatically Be Closed? (Jan. 2016), http://ecs.force.
com/mbdata/mbquestNB2?rep=CS1515.
177. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A MODEL LAW FOR SUPPORTING THE 
GROWTH OF HIGH-QUALITY CHARTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11 (2d ed. 2016), http://
www.publiccharters.org/publications/model-law-supporting-high-quality-charter-public-
schools/; NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCH. AUTHORIZERS, PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR 
QUALITY CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZING (2015), http://www.qualitycharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Principles-and-Standards_2015-Edition.pdf. Automatic closures 
laws are not a feature of any private-school-choice program. However, as discussed previous-
ly, two states require the exclusion of persistently failing schools from further participation. 
See supra notes 124–125 and text accompanying notes.
178. See Ctr. for Res. on Educ. Outcomes, 2 LIGHTS OFF: PRACTICE AND IMPACT OF 
CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 21–23 (2017), http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/
Closure_FINAL_Volume_II.pdf.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, School Closures as Education Reform: New Evidence from 
Chicago and Ohio, 9 J. SCH. CHOICE 649 (2015) (reviewing evidence).
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parental-choice proponents Chester Finn and Bruno Manno re-
cently observed that there may be a “painful tradeoff” between 
quality and quantity in parental-choice programs, which is endemic 
to the “vexing reality . . . that market forces alone can’t reliably 
generate academic effectiveness.”181
Accountability proponents like Finn and Manno generally as-
sume that, while accountability regulations may suppress the quan-
tity of schools available to parents, the suppression of supply will be 
restricted on the tail end of the performance spectrum since the 
poorest-performing schools are those being excluded or closed. 
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case for two distinct rea-
sons. The first reason, flagged above, is that stringent accountabil-
ity policies may close or exclude schools that are struggling aca-
demically, but that also are better than the traditional public-school 
options available in a community. In this case, limiting the partici-
pation of bad charter and private schools may force some students 
into worse traditional public ones.
The second reason is that accountability policies may not only 
weed out poorly performing schools that are participating in 
choice programs but also may deter high-performing schools from 
entering publicly funded education markets because the operators 
of good schools may chafe at regulatory demands. Accountability 
policies advance the goal of more and better schools only if they suc-
ceed at weeding out bad schools without deterring the entrance of 
good ones.182 This is no easy task, especially since there is evidence 
that anxiety about regulations (current and future) is one of the 
primary factors influencing school operators’ decisions whether to 
participate in a parental-choice program, or, in the case of charter 
schools, to open a school in a given jurisdiction. For example, in a 
recent randomized control study, researchers found that some 
regulations, including especially open-enrollment mandates and 
standardized testing requirements, dramatically reduced the ex-
pected participation of private schools by, respectively, seventy per-
cent and forty-four percent.183
If one conceives of a parental-choice program as offering school 
operators a bargain—financial support in exchange for educating 
children and complying with program regulations—then the bur-
181. Bruno V. Manno & Chester E. Finn, Jr., A Progress Report on Charter Schools, 24 NAT’L
AFF. 3, 7 (2015).
182. See Brian Kisida et al., Views from Private Schools: Attitudes about School Choice Programs 
in Three States, American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 2015) at 13–18; cf. Amber M. Winkler & 
Chester E. Finn, Jr., Is the Red Tape a Red Herring, EDUC. NEXT (Jan. 30, 2013), https://
www.educationnext.org/is-the-red-tape-a-red-herring/.
183. See Corey DeAngelis et al., Do Voucher Regulations Reduce Anticipated Voucher Program 
Participation and School Quality?, EDUC. NEXT (Oct. 29, 2018).
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dens of the exchange must be properly calibrated with the benefits 
for school operators to accept the government’s offer. If the regu-
latory burdens are too high—or the financial support too low—
then some operators will decline to participate. This is particularly 
a problem in the private-school-choice context, where scholarship 
amounts tend to be only a fraction of the funding provided to 
charter and traditional public schools, often falling below private-
school tuition and/or cost to educate.184
Moreover, higher-performing schools are more likely to pass on 
bad bargains. In the private-school-choice context, high-
performing schools tend to have higher enrollments and sounder 
finances, so they do not need the infusion of public funds. In the 
charter-school context, the highest performing CMOs are actively 
recruited by multiple jurisdictions, and they reasonably favor those 
offering better bargains.185 Unfortunately, lower-performing 
schools likely are more willing to accept bad bargains to sustain 
operations or fill empty seats. In speculating about the reason for 
the disappointing early results of the Louisiana voucher program, 
for example, researchers hypothesized that “it could be the case 
that a higher-quality set of private schools participated in earlier 
voucher and scholarship programs . . . in which more positive 
voucher experimental impacts were reported.” They further ob-
served that “[l]ess than one-third of the private schools in Louisi-
ana chose to participate in the LSP [the voucher program] in its 
first year, possibly because of the extensive regulations placed on 
the program by government authorities combined with the rela-
tively modest voucher value relative to private-school tuition.”186
The regulatory anxieties of school operators pose a significant 
institutional design challenge. On the one hand, the risk that tra-
ditional public-school proponents will succeed in using the regula-
tory process to suppress and control their competitors is unques-
tionably a real one—as is the risk that anxieties about regulation 
will deter good schools’ participation. On the other hand, some of 
the regulatory hesitations of chosen schools—for example, re-
sistance to demands that they administer the same standardized 
184. Kisida et al., supra note 182, at 13–18.
185. See NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHOOLS ET AL., HOW TO RECRUIT HIGH-
PERFORMING CHARTER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS TO A NEW REGION: RESULTS FROM THE 
2015 CMO SURVEY 3–8 (2015), https://www.excelined.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
ExcelinEd.HowToRecruitHighPerformingCharterManagementOrganizationsToANew
Region.March2016.pdf.
186. Jonathan N. Mills & Patrick J. Wolf, The Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on 
Student Achievement After Two Years 37–38 (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.uaedreform.org/
downloads/2016/02/report-1-the-effects-of-the-louisiana-scholarship-program-on-student-
achievement-after-two-years.pdf.
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tests as traditional public schools—complicate accountability ef-
forts.187 It is difficult to compare the performance of students in 
schools that administer different standardized tests, a challenge 
that is discussed in more detail below. Other sources of regulatory 
anxieties—for example, the demands for autonomy over enroll-
ment, staffing and curriculum—can politically complicate efforts 
to enact and expand parental-choice programs.
C. Selection Bias
Selection-bias concerns haunt all efforts to compare the perfor-
mance of students across educational sectors. Opponents of paren-
tal choice frequently accuse private and charter schools of luring 
the best students away from traditional public schools and then 
taking credit for their success. Private schools and charter schools 
generally have more freedom to expel problematic students, as 
well. If such “cream skimming” occurs, then any “gains” resulting 
from parental choice are mere illusions: Transfer students who do 
better in private and charter schools do so because they are better 
students than the ones who remain behind.188
Whether, in fact, such cream skimming occurs is the subject of a 
vigorous debate. For example, there is some evidence that better 
educated, more motivated parents are more likely to take ad-
vantage of parental-choice opportunities.189 On the other hand, as 
previously discussed, selection-bias concerns may run in both di-
rections in the parental-choice context for a number of related 
reasons. To begin, at least in the urban public-school context, 
some research suggests that the cream may have already been 
skimmed. That is, many of the most motivated families have al-
ready exited struggling public schools, resulting in significantly re-
duced levels of within-school heterogeneity.190 Second, as discussed 
previously, many elements of parental-choice programs may mini-
mize selection-bias concerns and, indeed, may disadvantage choice 
187. See Kisida et al., supra note 182, at 12–18 (finding that twenty-five percent of school 
operators cited concerns about state testing requirements as an impediment to participa-
tion).
188. See, e.g., Joseph G. Altonji et al., Estimating the Cream Skimming Effect of School Choice,
123 J. POL. ECON. 266 (2015).
189. See, e.g., ANDREW D. CATT & EVAN RHINESMITH, WHY INDIANA PARENTS CHOOSE 16
(2017) (finding that better-educated parents found it easier to take advantage of choice op-
portunities in Indiana), https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Why-
Indiana-Parents-Choose-2.pdf#page=18.
190. Patrick Walsh, Effects of School Choice on the Margin: The Cream is Already Skimmed, 28 
ECON. OF EDUC. REV. 227–36 (2007).
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schools.191 In some states, charter schools must, by law, be concen-
trated in urban centers.192 Even when they are not required to do 
so, many charter schools choose to locate in disadvantaged com-
munities to serve disadvantaged students. That is their mission.193
In the private-school-choice context, virtually every program is ei-
ther means-tested or limited to special needs children; a handful of 
programs are both means-tested and limited to students attending 
failing public schools or residing in failing schools’ catchment 
boundaries.194 These restrictions effectively limit eligibility for par-
ticipation to students who are most likely to have fallen behind ac-
ademically. Moreover, within the eligible group, parents may be 
more likely to seek alternatives for children who are not doing well 
in their current school—either because they are struggling aca-
demically or because they have developed behavioral issues. In ei-
ther case, their chosen schools face the challenge of acculturating 
them to higher behavioral and academic expectations, as well as 
remediating past educational deficits.
D. Practical Limits of Empirically Driven Accountability Policies
Finally, most accountability policies rely heavily, if not exclusive-
ly, upon standardized test scores. As opponents of parental choice 
readily acknowledge in other contexts, these measures fail to cap-
ture many important indicia of school quality, including noncogni-
tive educational skills (for example, character, generosity, and re-
siliency) and achievements (for example, high school graduation 
and college matriculation and persistence) that predict long-term 
success better than test scores do. Cognitive measures of student 
performance at a school are, moreover, only one factor influenc-
ing a parent’s assessment of its quality. While the available evi-
dence suggests both that parents participating in choice programs
are more informed about their children’s schools than non-
191. See Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming, 40 
INT’L ECON. REV. 1395 (2008).
192. Are There Caps on the Growth of Charter Schools in this State?, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB.
CHARTER SCHOOLS, https://www.publiccharters.org/our-work/charter-law-database/
components/1 (Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma) (last visited Oct. 
23, 2018).
193. For example, the KIPP Charter Schools “aim to educate students in educationally 
underserved communities.” Ninety-five percent of the nearly ninety-six thousand students 
attending a KIPP school are African American or Latino, and eighty-eight percent qualify 
for federal free or reduced price lunch. KIPP NATIONAL REPORT CARD (2017), http://
www.kipp.org/results/national/#question-1:-are-we-serving-the-children-who-need-us.
194. See generally SCHOOL CHOICE YEARBOOK, supra note 8 (listing these characteristics in 
programs across the country for the 2015–2016 school year).
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participants and that they value school quality, it also suggests that 
parents consistently consider factors other than test scores (includ-
ing school culture, extra-curricular activities, after-school care, 
safety, discipline, proximity, and high school graduation rates) 
along with academic achievement scores when explaining why they 
chose their children’s schools.195 In the private-school-choice con-
text, some evidence suggests that a religious learning environment 
is an important factor influencing parental choice, especially 
among lower-income parents.196
Moreover, the tests used to measure the cognitive aspects of stu-
dent performance often are themselves deeply flawed. Decades of 
research suggests that standardized tests may include unintended 
cultural biases that may benefit more affluent, white students.197
NCLB required state accountability regimes to rely upon tests de-
signed to measure whether students achieved “proficiency” in cer-
tain state-determined learning goals.198 Unfortunately, state curric-
ular standards—and the tests measuring proficiency against those 
standards—varied dramatically both in terms of content and rigor.
This reality that provided the initial impetus for the development 
of the controversial Common Core State Standards.199 More recent-
ly, ESSA gave states latitude to move away from state-criteria-
referenced exams, and the state ESSA plans, discussed below, indi-
cate more than half have chosen to do so.200 Only time will tell 
whether these alternatives prove superior to the NCLB testing re-
gimes.
Even in states with rigorous academic expectations and well-
designed tests, measures of “proficiency” can mask important dif-
195. See generally Heidi Holmes Erickson, How Do Parents Choose Schools, and What Schools 
Do they Choose? A Literature Review of Private School Choice Programs in the United States, 11 J. SCH.
CHOICE 491, 497–501 (2017). See also DOUGLAS N. HARRIS & MATTHEW F. LARSEN, EDUC.
RESEARCH ALL. FOR NEW ORLEANS, WHAT SCHOOLS DO FAMILIES WANT (AND WHY)? (2015), 
http://educationresearchalliancenola.org/files/publications/ERA1402-Policy-Brief-What-
Schools-Do-Families-Want-3.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Thomas B. Fordham Institute, What Parents Want: Education Preferences and 
Trade-Offs (Aug. 2013), https://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/
20130827_What_Parents_Want_Education_Preferences_and_Trade_Offs_FINAL.pdf; CATT 
& RHINESMITH, supra note 189, at 28–29 (finding that parents participating in Indiana’s
voucher and tax credit scholarship programs ranked “religious environment and instruc-
tion,” “safe environment,” “moral/character/values instruction,” along with “academic qual-
ity,” as among the most important factors influencing school selection), https://
www.edchoice.org/research/indiana-parents-choose/.
197. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, 34 Problems with Standardized Tests, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/04/19/34-problems-
with-standardized-tests.
198. See supra notes 95–98 and text accompanying notes.
199. National Governors Association et al., Benchmarking for Success: Ensuring U.S. Student 
Receive a World-Class Education 24 (2008), https://www.edweek.org/media/benchmakring%
20for%20success%20dec%202008%20final.pdf.
200. See supra note 107 and text accompanying note.
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ferences between schools. Consider, for example, two schools with 
identical proficiency levels—say, fifty percent. If seventy-five per-
cent of the students at one of the schools were significantly below 
proficiency the previous year, while student scores at the second 
school remained stable, then it would be reasonable to give the 
first school a higher accountability rating. For this reason, most ac-
ademic studies comparing the performance of schools focus on 
student growth rather than proficiency.201 While ESSA requires that 
states measure and report school quality using both growth as well 
as proficiency, regulators are frequently elusive and opaque about 
the details of growth determinations.202
V. OPTIMAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHOSEN SCHOOLS
If the goal of accountability regulations in the parental-choice 
context is to ensure that parents only have good choices to make, these 
complexities dramatically complicate regulatory design efforts. If, 
on the other hand, the goal of accountability regulations in the pa-
rental-choice context is to help parents make good choices, then the 
complexities are not insurmountable. Indeed, regulations in pa-
rental-choice programs, designed with potential complications in 
mind, can empower parents to serve the accountability function 
that early advocates assumed that they would. By choosing wisely, 
parents can drive improvements not only in their own child’s per-
formance, but also in school quality overall, limiting the need for 
punitive regulatory interventions.
To advance this goal, accountability regulations must satisfy two 
criteria. First, accountability regulations must arm parents with the 
information they need to make wise choices for their kids, which 
means that information about school quality must be transparent, 
201. See, e.g., Matthew Chingos, Why the Proficiency v. Growth Debate Matters for Assessing 
School Performance, URBANWIRE: EDUC. & TRAINING (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.urban.org/
urban-wire/why-proficiency-versus-growth-debate-matters-assessing-school-performance; Mi-
chael J. Petrilli & Aaron Churchill, Why States Should Use Growth, and not Proficiency Rates, 
When Gauging School Effectiveness, FLYPAPER (Oct. 13, 2016), https://edexcellence.net/
articles/why-states-should-use-student-growth-and-not-proficiency-rates-when-gauging-school;
Morgan Polikoff, Proficiency vs. Growth: Toward a Better Measure, FUTUREED (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.future-ed.org/work/proficiency-vs-growth-toward-a-better-measure/.
202. See COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCH. OFFICERS, CONSIDERATIONS FOR INCLUDING 
GROWTH IN ESSA STATE ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 11 (2017) (emphasizing need for clarity 
in growth measures), https://www.nciea.org/sites/default/files/pubs-tmp/CCSSO_
Growth_Resource.pdf. For information on ESSA accountability implementation generally, 
see Brandon L. Wright & Michael J. Petrilli, Rating the Rating: An Analysis of the 51 ESSA Ac-
countability Plans (Nov. 2017), http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/
11.15%20-%20Rating%20the%20Ratings%20-%20An%20Analysis%20of%
20the%2051%20ESSA%20Accountability%20Plans.pdf.
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readily available, easy to interpret, and matched, to the greatest ex-
tent possible, with the indicia of school quality that matter to par-
ents in the real world. Second, accountability regulations must 
promote educational pluralism. Accountability regulations should 
aim to expand the number and variety of schooling options availa-
ble to parents, to provide them with more and better schools. In 
most cases, the best way to advance this goal is by attracting good 
schools to choice markets, rather than by forcing bad ones to exit 
them. While the exclusion of persistently failing schools from 
choice markets is perhaps a necessary element of an accountability 
regime, it should not be the primary element. The long history of 
accountability efforts in the United States demonstrates both that 
punitive government regulations rarely drive school improvement 
and that closing bad schools works as a reform only when better 
options are available. The remainder of this essay suggests a few 
broad design elements that can help accountability regulations ac-
complish these goals.
A. Encourage Transparency
The central goal of accountability in the parental-choice context 
should be encouraging transparency. After all, parents need in-
formation to make informed decisions for their children. Going 
forward, transparency will primarily be a concern in the private-
school-choice context, in large part because ESSA promises to in-
crease the accessibility of school-quality information for charter 
schools. While ESSA and the U.S. Department of Education regu-
lations implementing it allow states to choose their own research-
based indicators of academic success, it also requires states to dis-
aggregate and report data on student progress by demographic 
subgroups to ensure that disadvantaged groups make adequate 
progress. ESSA further requires states to issue an annual report 
card on every public school, including charter schools. While 
NCLB also required school report cards, ESSA requirements are 
different. NCLB report cards included state assessment results, the 
percentage of students not tested, graduation rates and adequate 
yearly progress measures. ESSA mandates that report cards include 
information about student achievement on the state’s chosen test, 
at least one other academic measure (student growth for elemen-
tary schools and four-year graduation rates for high schools), pro-
gress toward English proficiency for English language learners, and 
the other indicators of school quality and student success discussed 
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above.203 The ESSA-mandated reporting requirements also include 
exclusionary disciplinary and chronic absenteeism rates, as well as
disaggregated rates of students who graduate from high school and 
enroll in higher education.204 The federal regulations implement-
ing ESSA further require that report cards for charter schools in-
clude a comparison of demographic and achievement data for 
each charter school and the district and neighborhood in which it 
is located.205
To be sure, ESSA’s reporting requirements do not guarantee in-
formed choices. To begin, the meaning of student achievement 
scores, especially those disaggregated at the school level, is not al-
ways evident. While nationally normed tests tend to report relative-
ly straightforward percentile scores, the meaning of scores on the 
criteria-referenced tests can be unclear.206 Most reports employ ti-
ers of performance without clear meaning (such as, “not profi-
cient,” “approaching proficient,” “proficient,” and “above profi-
cient,” or, in the author’s home state of Indiana, “did not pass,”
“pass” and “pass plus”). The Partnership for Assessment of Readi-
ness for College and Careers (PARCC) test, which a number of 
states have opted to use as the basis for the academic assessments 
required by ESSA, reports scores in five “levels,” along with infor-
mation suggesting students’ and their school’s performance rela-
tive to the district and state.207 And, measures of student growth, 
which are arguably more important than raw achievement scores as 
a school-quality, are even more difficult to understand. The stand-
ard means of reporting growth, a percentile score comparing a 
given student’s performance to other students with a similar prior 
test score, provides a rough snapshot of student progress that 
masks enormous statistical complexity.208 Measures of aggregate 
school quality in state accountability regimes are both frustratingly 
203. See Daarel Burnette II, ESSA Brings User-Friendly Makeover of State Report Cards, EDUC.
WEEK (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/10/25/essa-brings-user-
friendly-makeover-of-state-report.html.
204. See Jessica Pointer, How Will ESSA Change Ohio’s School Report Cards?, EDEXCELLENCE
(June 13, 2016), https://edexcellence.net/articles/how-will-essa-change-ohio%E2%80%99s-
school-report-cards.
205. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, amended by the Every
Student Succeeds Act-Accountability and State Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,076, 86,175–76 (Nov. 
29, 2016).
206. For a description of nationally normed versus criterion referenced tests, see What’s
the Difference? Criterion-Referenced Tests Vs. Norm-Referenced Tests, RENAISSANCE https://
www.renaissance.com/2018/07/11/blog-criterion-referenced-tests-norm-referenced-tests/
(last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
207. Score Report Guide, UNDERSTAND THE SCORE, http://www.understandthescore.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/UTS-Sample-Full-Score-Rpeort.compressed.pdf.
208. See Reform Support Network, Emerging Approaches to Measuring Student Growth (Aug. 
2015), at 2, https://www2.ed.gov/about/inits/ed/implementation-support-unit/tech-assist/
emergapprotomeasurstudgrowth.pdf.
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opaque and moving targets. For examples, most states use either 
an A-F school grading system or a numerical index to report over-
all school quality. The overall school score often aggregates nu-
merous factors (in some cases dozens) in a statistically complex 
way, making it difficult for parents and schools to interpret.209 Cur-
rently, it is unclear how states report their “noncognitive” measures 
of school quality or how these measures will be combined with 
others and captured in aggregate scoring of school quality.
Despite these difficulties, available school-quality information 
about charter schools and traditional public schools is far more 
readily accessible to parents than information about private 
schools participating in parental-choice programs. Although many 
programs require participating schools to administer a standard-
ized test and, in some cases, to report the results to regulators, 
these results are often not publicly available. There are four excep-
tions: In Wisconsin, all public schools and schools participating in 
the voucher program participate in the state accountability system 
and receive the same report cards.210 In Indiana, all private schools 
participating in the state’s voucher program, but not scholarship 
tax credit program, are subject to the same academic accountabil-
ity measures as traditional public schools and charter schools. That 
is, they must administer the state assessment, which forms the 
foundation of an A–F letter grade, along with several other 
measures including growth.211 Two other states, Louisiana and 
Ohio, report information about the performance of students par-
ticipating in choice programs, but not non-participating students 
in the same school. In Louisiana, every school accepts more than 
ten scholarship students is assigned a Scholarship Cohort Index 
(SCI) on a 150-point scale. The SCI in K-6 schools is based solely 
upon the performance of the scholarship students on the Louisi-
ana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) test. In K-8 schools, 
five percent of the score includes a measure intended to capture 
high school readiness. In high schools, the scores are based upon a 
mix of graduation rates, state test scores, and ACT scores.212 In 
209. See, e.g., IND. DEP’T EDUC., HOW TO CALCULATE GRADES (Apr. 27, 2016), https://
www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/accountability/how-calculate-f-school-grades-04-27-2016.
pdf; ARIZ. DEP’T EDUC., ARIZONA 2016-2017 K-8 A-F SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY PLAN (Apr. 24, 
2017), https://azsbe.az.gov/sites/default/files/media/FINAL%20A-F%20Plan_2.pdf; OKLA.
DEP’T EDUC., A TO F REPORT CARD CALCULATION GUIDE (Sept. 29. 2015), http://sde.ok.gov/
sde/sites/ok.gov.sde/files/documents/files/AtoFReportCardGuide.pdf.
210. WISC. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ABOUT WISCONSIN ACCOUNTABILITY, https://
dpi.wi.gov/accountability (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
211. IND. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDIANA CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM, https://www.doe.in.
gov/choice (last visited Sept. 25, 2018).
212. LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOUISIANA NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 
CARD 9–10 (2015), https://www.louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/school-choice/
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Ohio, private schools participating in one of the state’s voucher 
programs are required to administer the state’s assessment test, but 
non-participating students may opt out. The state department of 
education reports proficiency rates for all tested students as well as 
voucher recipients for each school.213 Both the Louisiana Scholar-
ship Cohort Index and the student assessment results reported in 
Ohio are imperfect measures of school quality, however, because 
only voucher recipients must take the test.214
The fact that so few states require private schools participating 
in school choice programs to make achievement data available 
publicly likely reflects a political reality: Proponents of private-
school choice have not prioritized—and in some cases have resist-
ed—efforts to condition participation in these programs on disclo-
sure of the kinds of data required of public schools. Private schools 
have traditionally been exempted from state accountability re-
quirements. Over time, the increased transparency required of 
public and charter schools by ESSA may incentivize more private 
schools to release achievement data voluntarily, but private 
schools’ continued anxieties about transparency may continue to 
fuel resistance to mandatory disclosure. It is therefore possible that 
efforts to mandate disclosures of the kind required by ESSA will 
face political opposition, but also that imposing these require-
ments may dissuade some private schools from participating in pri-
vate-school-choice programs.215 One survey of private schools in pa-
rental-choice states found that twenty-one percent of the schools 
opting not to participate listed mandatory disclosure of test results 
as a reason for eschewing participation.216
Given these realities, as an alternative, states might opt to incen-
tivize rather than mandate disclosure. For example, rather than 
mandating that schools participating in private-school-choice pro-
grams conform to the disclosure regimes required of public and 
2015-louisiana-nonpublic-school-choice—-annual-report.pdf; LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOUISIANA 
SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION GUIDE 18 app. C (July 2018), https://www.louisiana
believes.com/docs/default-source/school-choice/scholarship-program-participation-guide.
pdf.
213. OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., TEST SCORES FOR VOUCHER STUDENTS, http://education.
ohio.gov/Topics/Other-Resources/Scholarships/Test-Scores-for-Voucher-Students (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2018).
214. How to Understand School Performance Scores and Grades, LENS, http://
thelensnola.org/how-to-understand-school-performance-scores-and-grades/ (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2018) (explaining the public school performance score; the SCI is calculated in the 
same way but limited to scholarship recipients); see also JESSICA POINTER, THOMAS B.
FORDHAM INST., OHIO’S VOUCHER PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 10 (Feb. 2017), http://edex.s3-
us-west-2.amazonaws.com/publication/pdfs/Vouchers%20in%20Ohio%20whitepaper%20
published%202-16-17.pdf.
215. See Stuit & Doan, supra note 117, at 25.
216. Id. at 26.
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charter schools, states might provide financial incentives to en-
courage disclosure. States might offer modestly higher scholarship 
amounts for students attending schools that agree to disclose in-
formation about student achievement, or, alternatively, expand the 
income eligibility range for participation in parental-choice pro-
grams for students attending such schools. In other words, states 
could, permit these schools to accept moderate-income, as well as 
low-income, students. Another option would be for states to make 
the public-school accountability regime a default rule for all partic-
ipating schools, but permit schools to opt out if they adopt trans-
parency practices that conform to certain minimal standards.217
Since private schools have not traditionally administered state tests, 
providing the option of trading greater transparency for flexibility 
in assessment may be attractive to many school leaders, especially if 
the alternative is participation in the state assessment regime.
B. Permit Flexibility
As discussed previously, ESSA gives states the autonomy to select 
the criteria that they will use to assess school quality. ESSA, howev-
er, requires that states use the same assessment criteria for both 
public and charter schools and mandates transparent reporting of 
the results of school assessments. Neither requirement, however, 
applies to private schools, including schools participating in paren-
tal-choice programs. As a result, states are free to give private 
schools flexibility in selecting their own assessment measures, and 
most do so. Currently, four states—Indiana, Ohio, Louisiana, and 
Wisconsin—and the District of Columbia require all students par-
ticipating in voucher programs to take the state tests. Only Indiana 
requires schools to administer the test to non-participants, and on-
ly Indiana and Louisiana penalize schools with persistently poor 
performance on the tests.218 Eight states allow private schools par-
ticipating in choice programs to choose between administering 
state assessments or a nationally normed test. The remaining pa-
217. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 158–62 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1995) (discussing regulatory 
default rules).
218. See Stuit & Doan, supra note 117, at 34–36; see also WISC. DEP’T OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR SCHOOLS PARTICIPATING IN THE MILWAUKEE 
PARENTAL PROGRAM, RACINE PARENTAL CHOICE PROGRAM, AND WISCONSIN PARENTAL CHOICE 
PROGRAM, https://dpi.wi.gov/assessment/parental-choice-program (last visited Sept. 25, 
2018).
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rental-choice states do not require participating private schools to 
administer standardized tests.219
The goal of promoting transparency among private schools is 
linked to the willingness to permit a range of assessments. Many 
private schools object to state testing mandates. They assert that 
state testing mandates will force them to align with state exams, 
which may unduly constrain their ability to innovate and differen-
tiate themselves from other schools. Moreover, since private 
schools do not always adhere to state curricular requirements, stu-
dent performance on state exams is not necessarily an accurate re-
flection of student achievement and progress.220
The principal challenge of permitting multiple tests is compara-
tive: Since traditional public and charter schools must use the same 
assessment, “apples to apples” comparisons across schools and sec-
tors are possible. These comparisons, which allow regulators and 
parents, if the results are made public, to understand student 
achievement across the educational system, become impossible if 
private schools opt for other assessment devices or none at all. For 
example, nationally normed tests report percentile scores that 
compare other test takers to one another rather than measuring 
student “proficiency” on items and concepts included in a standard 
state curriculum. There are significant tradeoffs, however, includ-
ing the risk that requiring the administration of state-mandated 
exams may deter participation in parental-choice programs.221
A compromise position would be to permit private schools to 
choose the researched-based testing regime of their choice but re-
quire the public reporting of results, ideally for all children en-
rolled in a school and not just those participating in the program. 
While multiple testing regimes complicates comparisons across 
sectors and between private schools administering different tests, a 
transparency requirement will empower parents with far more in-
formation than is currently available publicly while preserving 
schools’ curricular autonomy. Moreover, over time, the “apples-to-
oranges” challenges may diminish as more states opt for national 
rather than state tests. ESSA proposals submitted in the fall of 2017 
suggests that a number of states already are eschewing state-
219. Stuit & Doan, supra note 117, at 15.
220. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS (Dec. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/
AccountabilityInPrivateSchoolChoice.pdf.
221. Moreover, since private schools were also exempt from the NCLB’s accountability 
regime, many have never adhered to the state curricular requirements tested on criteria-
referenced tests, skewing proficiency levels downward. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST.,
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND PRIVATE SCHOOL CHOICE 9 (Jan. 2014), https://edexcellence.
net/publications/public-accountability-private-school-choice.
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criterion-referenced assessments. Twenty-one states have opted to 
use one of two tests based upon the Common Core Standards 
(PARCC test or the Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium 
test); fourteen states plan to use the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress test for at least some grades; and twenty-two states 
will administer the ACT or SAT tests to assess high schoolers’ per-
formance.222
C. Develop Alternative Measures of School Quality
A related goal for all accountability regulations should be for 
states to focus on developing tools to measure school quality other 
than student test scores and incentivizing chosen schools to report 
their performance based on these factors. ESSA requires states to 
employ at least one non-test-score-based method of school quality. 
States have opted for a range of measures including, inter alia,
chronic absenteeism,223 access to a diverse curriculum;224 rigor of 
222. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ESSA STATE PLAN SUBMISSION, https://www2.ed.gov/
admins/lead/account/stateplan17/statesubmission.html (providing links to individual state 
plans).
223. Thirty-three states, Puerto Rico, and Washington, D.C., have included some form of 
measuring absenteeism as an indicator, with many of those states using it as their only indi-
cator. See generally id. (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinoi, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washington, D.C.). Oregon and Tennessee 
measure teacher chronic absenteeism in the same way as student absenteeism. OR. DEP’T
EDUC., OREGON’S CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 46 
(2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/orconsolidatedstateplan.
pdf; TENN. DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: BUILDING ON SUCCESS IN TENNESSEE
61 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/tnconsolidatestateplan
817.pdf.
224. See, e.g., CONN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., CONNECTICUT CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 
UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 41 (2017) (including measures for fine arts and 
physical education), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ctconsostate
plan.pdf; GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATING GEORGIA’S FUTURE: GEORGIA’S STATE PLAN FOR 
THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT, 33–34 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/
account/stateplan17/gaconsolidatedstateplan.pdf (measures include the number of stu-
dents who received a passing grade in fine arts, world language, physical education/health, 
and career exploration); LA. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOUISIANA’S ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY 
EDUCATION PLAN PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 45 (2017) (in-
cluding access to arts education, physical education, foreign language classes, and more), 
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/lastateplan882017.pdf; MD. STATE 
DEP’T OF EDUC., MARYLAND EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) CONSOLIDATED STATE 
PLAN 26 (2017) (measuring enrollment in science, social studies, fine arts, physical educa-
tion and health at the elementary level, fine arts, physical education, health and computa-
tion learning at the middle school level, and completion of Advanced Placement and Inter-
national Baccalaureate classes at the high school level), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/
account/stateplan17/mdconsolidatedstateplan.pdf [hereinafter Maryland State Plan]; N.Y.
DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 61 (2017) 
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high school curriculum;225 post-secondary enrollment and persis-
tence;226 and, in a handful of states, measures of school climate227
and parental satisfaction.228 Interestingly, despite significant ongo-
ing efforts to incorporate character education, as well as social and 
emotional learning competencies, into public-school curricula,229
no state opted to employ measures of them, at least in the short 
term, to satisfy ESSA.230 A few states’ ESSA plans included among 
long-term goals the measurement of social and emotional learning, 
but the criteria for such measures have yet to be determined.231
(indicating future plans to adopt a measure of art education, music education, and physical 
education), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nyconsolidatedstate
plan.pdf.
225. At least nineteen states have included in their plans an indicator measuring access 
to Advanced Placement (AP) and International Baccalaureate (IB) classes. See generally U.S.
DEP’T EDUC., supra note 222 (Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, D.C. Georgia, Indiana, Loui-
siana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Okla-
homa, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont and Washington); see also SAMANTHA BATEL, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, MEASURING SUCCESS: AN OVERVIEW OF NEW SCHOOL CLASSIFICATION 
INDICATORS UNDER ESSA 6–7 (2017).
226. See CONN. DEP’T OF EDUC., CONNECTICUT CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE 
EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 39, 41 (2017); MICH. DEP’T OF EDUC., MICHIGAN’S 
CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 34 (2017); N.Y. DEP’T
OF EDUC., REVISED DATE TEMPLATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 69 (2018); R.I.
DEP’T OF EDUC., RHODE ISLAND’S EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT STATE PLAN FOR SUBMISSION 
TO U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 30–31 (2017); VT. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED STATE 
TEMPLATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 54–55 (2017).
227. See, e.g., D.C. STATE BD. OF EDUC., DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REVISED STATE TEMPLATE 
FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 21 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/
account/stateplan17/dcconsolidatedstateplan.pdf; IOWA DEP’T EDUC., EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT IN IOWA 46 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/
stateplan17/iaconsolidatedstateplan.pdf; Maryland State Plan, supra note 224, at 26; NEVADA 
DEP’T OF EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 51 
(2017), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nvconsolidatedstateplan.
pdf.
228. COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) 68 (2017).
229. See, e.g., AEI/BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY,
OPPORTUNITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND SECURITY: A CONSENSUS PLAN FOR REDUCING POVERTY &
RESTORING THE AMERICAN DREAM 59–61 (2015); MORAL DEVELOPMENT, SELF, AND IDENTITY 
(Daniel K. Lapsley & Darcia Narvaez eds., 2013); Joseph A. Durlak et al., The Impact of En-
hancing Students’ Social and Emotional Learning: A Meta-Analysis of School Based Universal Inter-
ventions, 82 CHILD DEV. 405 (2011); Victoria Clayton, The Psychological Approach to Educating 
Kids, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2017/03/the-social-emotional-learning-effect/521220/; Roger Weisburg, Why Social 
and Emotional Learning is Essential for Students, EDUTOPIA (Feb. 15, 2016), https://
www.edutopia.org/blog/why-sel-essential-for-students-weissberg-durlak-domitrovich-
gullotta;.
230. See Evie Blad, No State Will Measure Social and Emotional Learning under ESSA: Will that 
Slow Its Momentum? EDUC. WK. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/
10/04/no-state-will-measure-social-emotional-learning-under.html.
231. COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN UNDER THE EVERY STUDENT 
SUCCEEDS ACT (ESSA) 68 (2017); OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUC., DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA REVISED STATE TEMPLATE FOR THE CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN 21–24, 62 
(2017).
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The development of alternative measures of school quality is 
particularly important in the parental-choice context for three re-
lated reasons. First, as discussed previously, while parents clearly 
value school quality, it is not the only, or even in some cases the 
most important, factor influencing school choice decisions. Par-
ents value a range of factors, and they make tradeoffs between 
their preferences when selecting schools.232 Moreover, academic 
test scores are only one among a range of factors that parents con-
sider when evaluating the quality of their children’s schools; some 
studies find that only a minority of parents rank test scores as the 
most important predictor of school quality.233 Logically, if a goal of 
accountability regulations is to help parents make informed deci-
sions, then the regulations should rely upon and require schools to 
report about the factors that matter to parents, not just those that 
are easiest to collect.
Second, in a choice environment where schools administer a 
range of standardized tests, these alternative measures might miti-
gate the apples-to-oranges comparison problem described above. 
Presumably, all schools can measure and report in a uniform way, 
for example, truancy and graduation rates. Last, the research dis-
cussed above suggests that standardized test scores alone may un-
derestimate the benefits of parental choice, because the biggest 
payoffs of giving parents options for their children tended to be re-
flected in longer-term effects on high school graduation, college 
enrollment, and persistence, among other examples.234 Incorporat-
ing non-test-score measures of school quality may also reduce the 
resistance of private-school operators to transparency.
D. Structure Closure and Exclusion Rules to Preserve Better Choices
Finally, and importantly, accountability policies in school choice 
contexts ought to be structured to prevent closing charter schools 
and/or excluding private schools from parental-choice programs if 
they are better than the other educational options in a community. 
This is because the available evidence strongly suggests that closing
failing schools leads to academic improvements if—and only if—
affected students transfer to higher-performing schools.235 Unfor-
tunately, since many do not, the overall academic effects of school 
232. See Erickson, supra note 195, at 501–03.
233. Id. at 501.
234. See, e.g., Rouse & Barrow supra note 81.
235. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, 2 LIGHTS OFF: PRACTICE AND IMPACT OF 
CLOSING LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS 13–27 (2017), http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/
Closure_FINAL_Volume_II.pdf.
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closures (in both the charter and traditional public-school sector) 
are negative.236 However, a recent study by Stanford’s Center for 
Research Educational Outcomes found that students displaced by 
charter-school closures tend to do better than those displaced by 
the closure of a traditional public school, especially in states that 
worked with authorizers to “choreograph” the closure of charter 
schools to ensure that students landed in a higher-performing 
school.237
The fact that some states and authorizers were able to mitigate 
the negative effects of closure by attending to the other schooling 
options available to displaced children suggests that accountability 
policies should attend to this variable as well. In other words, the
accountability system should take into account the comparative 
strength of other local schools before closing or excluding charter 
or private schools for academic performance. Two states’ charter-
closure laws—California’s and Florida’s—provide a potential mod-
el of comparative accountability regulations. Florida’s charter-
school law mandates the closure of charter schools that receive an 
F two years in a row through the state’s accountability metrics, but 
makes an exception for failing charter schools located in the same 
attendance zone as a failing public school.238 California’s charter-
school law requires authorizers to close charter schools that fail to 
meet certain academic benchmarks unless the authorizer finds that 
the school’s academic performance is at least equal to perfor-
mance at public schools the students would otherwise be required 
to attend.239
CONCLUSION
Despite proponents’ hopes, parental choice is not a panacea. 
But, as the troubled experience to improve public-school perfor-
mance demonstrates, accountability is not a panacea either. Still, as 
the footprint of parental-choice programs continues to expand, 
and more and more American children are enrolled in publicly fi-
nanced but privately operated schools, both charter and private, 
demands to use the law to hold chosen schools accountable for 
their performance will only intensify. This Article has examined 
the vexing questions posed by accountability efforts in parental-
choice contexts and proposed several principles to guide regulato-
236. Id. at 12–21.
237. Id. at 17–19.
238. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.33(n)(2) (West 2016).
239. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47607(b) (West 2016).
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ry design efforts. These principles flow from the assumption that 
accountability regulations should seek to empower parents to serve 
their intended accountability function by making informed deci-
sions for their children among a cross-sector range of more and bet-
ter schools.
